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PARSING THE ME G OF ''ADVERSE 
EMPLO NT ACTION'' IN TITLE VII DISPARATE 
TREATMENT, SEXUAL H SSMENT, 
RETALIATION CLAIMS: AT SHOULD BE 
ACTIONABLE ONGDOING? 
ROSALIE BERGER LEVINSON* 
I. Introduction 
Title Vll of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits disparate treatment on 
the basis of race, religion, sex, and national origin with regard to all terms and 
conditions of employment. I Title vn also bans retaliatory discrimination 
against those who complain of Title VIT violations.2 Despite the broad 
language in the text, the circuit courts are divided as to how much harm an 
employee must endure before claims of disparate treatment and retaliation are 
actionable.3 An increasingly complex body of law has developed that greatly 
* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. J.D., 1973, Valparaiso 
University School of Law; M.A., 1970, B.A., 1969, Indiana University. 
l. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (2000). Section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
provides: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ( 1) to fail or 
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against 
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion. sex, or national 
origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would 
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a), 78 Stat. 241, 255. 
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Section 704(a) of the Civil Rights Act reads as follows: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate 
against any of his employees or applicants for employment, ... because he has 
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this [subchapter], 
or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner 
in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this [subchapter]. 
§ 704(a), 78 Stat. at 257. 
3. See, for example, Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2000), pointing out that 
the circuits have aligned themselves with a broad, restrictive, or intennediate position as to what 
constitutes an adverse employment action in the context of retaliation claims brought under Title 
Vll. /d. at 1240-42. In Ray, the Ninth Circuit ultimately joined the First, Seventh, Tenth, 
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits in adopting an expansive view of the types of action that can be 
considered adverse employment actions. /d. at 124243. It cited the most restrictive view as 
that held by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, which hold that only "ultimate employment actions, 
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• 
restricts the types of discriminatory and retaliatory conduct that qualifies as 
adverse employment action. In part, the confusion arises because lower courts 
have indiscriminately borrowed from the U.S. Supreme Court's sexual 
harassment cases where "tangible harm" was made a prerequisite to imposing 
absolute vicarious liability on employers for the sexually harassing conduct 
• • 
of supervisors.4 The Court did not, however, make tangible hartn an element 
of every disparate treatment case. 5 It is well understood today that employers 
cannot base hiring, firing, promotion, or demotion decisions on an individual's 
race, gender, or religion. Unfortunately, when discrimination takes on more 
subtle, less tangible forms, courts have faltered in enforcing Title Vll's goal 
of achieving equal employment opportunity.6 
are actionable. ld. at 1242. It also cited the Second and Third Circuits as adopting an 
inte1 mediate position requiring "a materially adverse change in the tenns and conditions of 
employment." /d. (quoting Tones v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 640 (2d Cir. 1997)). Several other 
courts have also recognized the division among the circuits. See Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't 
of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 445-46 (2d Cir. 1999) (discussing the disagreement among the 
circuits over how egregious an employer's conduct must be to give rise to a retaliation claim 
under Title VII); Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th Cir~ 1998) 
(noting that whereas the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have required that the act of retaliation be an 
"ultimate employment action," the First, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have all held that Title VII's 
protection against retaliatory discrimination extends "to adverse actions which fall short of 
ultimate employment decisions" and adopting the majority view). The cases discussed in this 
Article suggest that courts, even within the so-called "expansive" and "interntediate" circuits, 
are issuing decisions that reflect a restrictive view as to what banns are actionable both in the 
context of retaliation and disparate treatment claims. See also Rebecca Hanner White, De 
Minimis Discrimination, 41 EMORY L.J. 1121, 1126 (1998) ("[T]here is a real and growing 
disarray concerning which improperly motivated employment decisions are legally actionable."). 
4. The Supreme Court detennined in Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 
( 1998), that vicarious liability would be imposed whenever a supervisor sexually harassed an 
employee, but held that, in the absence of a "tangible employment action," the employer could 
assert an affirmative defense. ld. at 765; see discussion infra Part ill. 
5. See discussion infra Part ill. 
6. Because Title Vll principles have been broadly applied to govern claims brought under 
other discrimination provisions, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), the implications of this development are 
very broad. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (finding that 
courts may apply Title VII principles to the ADEA claims because "the substantive provisions 
of the ADEA 'were derived in haec verba from Title Vll"') (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 
575, 584 (1978)); see also Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446,456 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding 
that the standards used to evaluate Title VII claims can be applied to claims under the ADA, 
ADEA, and ERISA). Each of these acts also bars retaliatory conduct. See Fair Labor Standards 
Act (FLSA) of 1938,29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2000); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967 (ADEA), id.§ 623(d); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), id. 
§ 1140; Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2000). Other 
federal statutes also prohibit unlawful retaliation. See National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 
2003] WHA·T SHOUW BE ACTIONABLE WRONGDOING? 625 
The question of harm arises mostfrequently where an employer subjects an 
employee to noneconomic, or at least indirect, economic injury. Numerous 
decisions have rejected claims where the employer's discriminatory or 
retaliatory conduct consisted of ( 1) transfers~ demotions, or changes in title or 
duties that did not involve the actual loss of salary or tangible job benefits;7 
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (2000); Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), id. § 660(c); 
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), id. § 2615. Recent decisions under these acts 
reflect the same narrow interpretation of an adverse employment action. See, e.g., Kersting v. 
' . 
Wal-Mart Stores,. Inc., 250 F.3d 1109, 1118-19 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding that retaliation claims 
under the ADA consisting of a verbal and written warning did not constitute material adverse 
actions because the warnings and other workplace allegations did not result in any tangible job 
consequences);. Tyler v.Jspat Inland; Inc., 245 F.3d 969, 972 .. 73 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
because an ADA plaintiffs salary and benefits remained the same after.his transfer, plaintiff had 
not plead an actionable adverse employment action); Hunt v. City of Markham, 219 F.3d 649, 
654 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that the denial of a bonus is not an actionable adverse employment 
action under the ADEA because bonuses are "generally ., .• sporadic, irregular, unpredictable, 
and wholly discretionary"); Shaner v. Synthes (USA), 204 F.3d 494~ 505-06 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(finding that an employee who alleged that he was denied training, and endured harassment 
when his coworkers increased the temperature of the office to exacerbate his disability, suffered 
isolated incidents of harassment that did not rise to the level of an adverse employment action 
necessary to maintain a claim of either discrimination or retaliation); Sanchez v. Denver Pub. 
Sch., 164 F~3d 527,531-32 (lOth Cir. 1998) (holding that a transfer that results in an increase 
in commuting time does not constitute an adverse employment action within the meaning of the 
. . . 
ADEA); Blackie v. Maine, 75 F.3d 716, 725 (1st Cir~ 1996) (stating that in an FLSA retaliation 
case it is essential "to show that the employer took a materially adverse employment action"); 
Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that; 
reassignment, without diminution in title, salary, or benefits, is not an adverse action under the 
ADEA because the change caused "no materially significant disadvantage"); Rodriguez v. Bd. 
ofEduc., 620 F.2d 362,366-67 (2d Cir.l980) (affmning summary judgment in an ADEA case 
involving the transfer of a teacher from junior high school where he taught special education 
classes to mainstream high school where he taught the same classes because this was not an 
actionable adverse employment action}. Note that these decisions are contrary to the EEOC 
Compliance Manual; discussed infra notes 78-84, which broadly defines the teJ"m "adverse 
action" in interpreting Title Vll, the ADEA, the EPA, and the ADA. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
0PPORTUNI'I'Y COMM'N, No. 915.003, COMPUANCE MANUAL§ 8-ll(D), at 8-11 to -15 (1998), 
available at http://www.eeoc . gov/docs/retal.pdf [hereinafter COMPUANCE MANUAL]. 
7. White v. Burlington N. & Sante Fe Ry., 310F.3d443, 451 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that 
a job transfer that involves heavy lifting: and more physically demanding tasks is not an adverse 
employment action because employee was not "materially disadvantaged"), vacated pending 
reh'g en bane, 32t ·F.3d 1203 (6th Cir. 2003); Jacob-Mua v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 517,521 (8th 
Cir. 2002) (failing to find that an involuntary transfer was an adverse employment action where 
"uncontroverted evidence" demonstrated that plaintiff's "position was marked for elimination 
in the ordinary course of business, he was offered a substitute_ position, and [plaintiff] did not 
suffer a loss in grade or pay when transferred"); Longstreet v. lll. Dep't ofCorr., 276 F. 3d 379, 
383-84 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that an employee suffering: from multiple sclerosis failed to 
show that her transfer to different and allegedly more onerous duty station was adverse 
employment action where evidence suggested she was able to perform at the new stati.on without 
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(2) negative evaluations, oral or written reprirnands, or ''unrealized" threats 
oftermination or demotion;8 (3) temporary suspensions or demotions where 
much difficulty and indeed worked there almost two years); Weeks v. <New York State (Div. of 
Parole), 273 F. 3d 76, 86 ... 87 (2d Cir. 200 I) (holding that transfer of employee from one office 
to another and physical removal from the first office was not adverse employment action where 
"[t]here [was] no allegation that reassignment constituted a demotion"; further, "even assum-
ing . ~ . physical removal was unprovoked ~ .. [the] allegation still fail[ ed] because [employee 
did] not allege" that it had a tangible adverse effect on the terms and conditions of employment), 
abrogated on other grounds by Nat') R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002); 
Stutler v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 263 F.3d 698, 702-04 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding that the lateral 
transfer of employee to another departanent following complaint about supervisor's race 
discrimination was not an adverse employment action even if employee did not like the new job, 
where there was no evidence that the transfer decreased employee's benefits or responsibilities 
in any way; to be actionable, adverse employment action must be a significant change in 
employment status or a decision causing a significant change in benefits); Boone v. Goldin, 178 
F. 3d 253, 256 (4th Cir~ 1999) (finding that the transfer of an employee to more stressful job did 
not qualify as adverse employment action because the employee failed to show that the transfer 
had a significant detrimental effect on him); Burger v. Cent. Apartment Mgmt., Inc.,_ 168 F.3d 
_875, 879 (5th Cir. 1999) (denying that a lateral transfer is an ultimate employment action 
necessary to state a claim for retaliation); Montandon v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 116 F.3d 35$, 
359 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that, "[h]owever unpalatable [it] may have been to [employee)," 
transfer to job in another town which did not entail a change in position, title, or salary, •'did not 
rise to the I eve) of an adverse employment action")~ 
8. Longstreet, 216 F.3d at 383-84 (holding that an employee's '"negative perfotrnance 
evaluations" and the requirement that she "substantiate ... her absences from work [as] illness-
related" were not "tangible job _consequences and therefore . . . not adverse employment 
actions ... under Title VII"); Weeks, 273 F.3d at 86-87 (holding that a female African-
American employee, who received notice of discipline as well as a counseling memo for 
misconduct and incompetence for failing to have her handcuffs and weapon, failed to state a 
prima facie case that she suffered an adverse e1nployment action even though similarly situated 
nonminority, nonfemale officers did not receive similar notices or memos; employee failed to 
describe any ramifications of the notice or memo or how either would create a materially 
adverse change in working conditions), abrogated on other grounds by Nat'l R.R. Passenger 
Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002); Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d420, 431 (3d Cir. 
2001) (finding that mere placement of two written reprimands in employee-'s personnel file after 
he complained about sexual harassment was not actionable where employee "was not demoted 
in title; did not have his work schedule changed, was not reassigned to a different position or 
location," and ''was not denied any pay raise or promotion as a result of[the] reprimands''); 
Krause v. City of La Crosse, 246 F.3d 995, 1000-01 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that a letter of 
reprimand alone is not an adverse employment action and that an employer's decision to move 
employee from front office to back room cann.ot be considered adverse); Davis v. Town of Lake 
. Park, 245 F.Jd 1232, 1240, 1246 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding that a negative job perforn1ance 
memorand~ which warned that continued misconduct would result in departmental action did 
notconstitute adverse employmentaction even if employer retained memo in officer's personnel 
file because officer did not lose pay or-benefits; nor was there evidence this could cause 
foreseeable future economic injury); Kortan v. Cal. Youth Auth., 217 F.3d II 04, 1112-13 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (ho.lding that allegations that employer was "less civil, stared at [employee] in a 
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no change in benefits occurs or benefits are subsequently restored;9 (4) 
hostile fashion," and gave her a lower evaluation was insufficient to constitute adverse action 
where plaintiff was not subjected to any "'intolerable' act" that required her to quit); Spears v. 
Mo. Dep't ofCorr. & Human Res., 210 F.3d 850, 853-54 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding that a lower 
perfortnance evaluation from "highly successful" to "successful" was not an adverse 
employment action where there was no evidence that the plaintiffs "[ d)epartment subsequently 
used [this] evaluation to her detriment"; rather, plaintiff contended only that evaluation 
'"demeaned her in the eyes of her coworkers"'); Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 458 (D.C. Cir. 
1999) (holding that fortnal criticism or poor perfonnance evaluations are not necessarily adverse 
actions where neither affects employee's salary); Primes v. Reno, 190 F.3d 765, 767 (6th Cir. 
1999) (holding that a negative perfo1tnance evaluation is not actionable because if courts 
classify low evaluations or other supervisory actions that disappoint employees as adverse 
actions, "[p]aranoia in the workplace would replace the prima facie case as the basis for a Title 
Vll cause of action"); Hollins v. Atlantic Co., 188 F.3d 652, 662 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that 
lowering perfonnance ratings did not establish a materially adverse employment action absent 
evidence that the scores had affected employee's wages,; further, threats made by supervisor 
were too ambiguous where they merely stated potential that employee would be transferred or 
tenninated, and it was unclear whether supervisor even had authority to do so); Robinson v. City 
of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that '"unsubstantiated oral 
reprimands' and 'unnecessary derogatory comments' ... do not rise to the level of . . . [an) 
'adverse employment action'" under the retaliation provision); Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 
104 F.3d 702, 708 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that threats to fue, reprimand, or give employee a 
"final warning" were not ultimate employment decisions). 
9. Stewart v. Evans, 275 F.3d 1126, 1135-36 (D.C. Cir~ 2002) (attempt to obstruct federal 
employee's award nomination was not an adverse employment action because the employee 
eventually received the award; further, delay in plaintiffs seeking appointment was not 
actionable retaliation since appointment was "not one of the terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment contemplated by Title Vll"); Pennington v. Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1267-68 
(11th Cir. 2001) (holding that decisions to reprimand or transfer are not adverse employment 
actions if they are "rescinded before the employee suffers [any] tangible hann"); Russell v. 
Principi, 257 F.3d 815, 819-20 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding that "temporary exposure to a higher 
risk" of being laid off resulting from the receipt of a lower bonus was simply an ''unrealized risk 
of a future adverse action" and was "too ephemeral to constitute an adverse employment 
action"); Weston, 251 F.3d at 431 (holding that two written reprimands placed in an officer's 
personnel file, which were not "perrnanently affixed," did not constitute an adverse employment 
action); Amro v. Boeing Co., 232 F.3d 790, 797-98 (lOth Cir. 2000) (finding that mere delay 
in granting the plaintiffs desired transfer did not constitute an adverse employment action even 
though it meant plaintiff had to continue working under supervisor who allegedly harassed him 
because plaintiff failed to show any other negative or unfavorable effect of that delay); Brooks 
v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 929-30 (lOth Cir. 2000) (finding that downgrading of 
plaintiff's perfortnance review from "satisfactory" to "needs improvement" "was not an adverse 
employment action because it was subject to modification by the city"; similarly, rescheduling 
employee to an unfavorable shift and denying her vacation preference were not actionable 
because decisions were not final and the "city accommodated [plaintiffs] preferences by 
allowing her to switch shifts and vacation dates with other employees"); Buettner v. Arch Coal 
Sales Co., 216 F.3d 707, 712, 715 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that although supervisor "told 
[employee] to pack her things and leave the building," plaintiff did not suffer adverse 
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changes in work schedules, increased workloads, or the denial or elimination 
of secretarial or other assistance, equipment, or supplies that is, employer 
actions that make the employee's job performance more difficult;10 (5) 
employment action because she was infonned the same day that she was not fired and temporary 
"[e]mployment actions which do not result in changes in pay, benefits, seniority, or 
responsibility are insufficient to sustain a retaliation claim"); Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212 
F. 3d 5 71, 58 7-89 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding that the assignment of professor to teach more credit 
hours than other professors and to teach classes on three different campuses during one session 
was not adverse employment action because the assignment was a mistake and it was promptly 
corrected so that employee never suffered any actual consequences; further, threatened letters 
that were never actually written did not meet threshold level of substantiality necessary· to be 
cognizable under the antiretaliation clause); Dobbs-Weinstein v. Vanderbilt Univ., 185 F.3d 
542, 545-46 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that a d~an's decision to oppose a department's tenure 
recommendation did not constitute adverse employment action where faculty member had 
recourse to the university's internal grievance process and was given tenure from the date she 
originally should have received it absent the dean's misconduct; interlocutory decisions, even 
if they cause emotional distress, are not actionable under Title VII provided they do not affect 
the ultimate outcome); Kerns v. Capital Graphics, Inc., 178 F.3d 1011, 1019 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that employer's attempt to overturn employee's unemployment benefits was not 
adverse employment action where the Iowa Civil Rights Commission ''ultimately refused to 
entertain the appeal" since it was untimely, and thus employee could not show that "the 
company's action . · .. inflicted any material employment disadvantage"); Mungin v. Katten 
Muchin & Zabis, 116 F.3d 1549, 1555 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding that, although a "no harm, no 
foul" rule affects only the question of remedy, not whether defendant is guilty of discrimination, 
some circuits have held that Congress did not intend '"interlocutory or mediate decisions having 
no immediate effect upon employment ... to fall [under] Title VII'") (quoting Page v. Bolger, 
645 F.2d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1981) (en bane)). 
10. Traylorv. Brown, 295 F.3d 783,789 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that an employer's refusal 
to allow the plaintiff to perfonn clerical and blacksmith duties did not constitute an adverse 
employment action where there was no effect on plaintiffs pay, her job responsibilities were 
not materially diminished, and plaintiff presented no evidence, other than her own conjecture, 
that the responsibilities she wanted to perfo11n were important to achieve a higher position for 
which she was otherwise qualified); Jacob-Mua, 289 F.3d at 522 (holding that employer who 
gave employee work assignments that exceeded her abilities and job duties, and who denied 
employee adequate equipment, skills training, as well as a timely promotion, could not be 
charged with subjecting an employee to an adverse employment action where evidence showed 
that employee's grade and pay actually increased over the period of her employment and she 
was provided an intern to assist her with her new tasks); Markel v. Bd. of Regents, 276 F.3d 
906, 911-12 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that a female employee's claims that "she was denied 
'better' equipment, the ability to travel and make presentations, and removed from certain 
accounts that caused her not to receive bonuses" did not constitute an actionable adverse 
employment action because the loss of services alone has never been held to be an adverse 
action); Aquilino v. Univ. ofKan., 268 F.3d 930,934-36 (lOth Cir. 2001) (holding that neither 
university's decision to remove assistant professor from a graduate student's dissertation 
committee, its decision not to approve any of her numerous applications for appointment to the 
university's graduate faculty, nor its decision not to hire her as an adjunct research associate 
suffice as an adverse employment action for a retaliation claim because none of the alleged 
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company-tolerated harassment or hostility by coworkers or supervisors; 11 and 
( 6) nonemployment related adverse action, such as the filing of specious union 
or criminal charges}2 Often, the employee alleges a combination of these 
actions was shown to have more than a de minimis effect on the employee's future employment 
opportunities; speculative harm regarding future employment prospects does not constitute an 
adverse employment action); Haugerud v. Amery Sch. Dist., 259 F.3d 678, 691-92 (7th Cir. 
200 1) (finding that allegations that employer tried to force a custodian to relinquish her position, 
told male night custodians not to help her, gave her responsibilities beyond what was expected 
of male custodians, and intentionally interfered with her perfornaance of work duties may have 
been harassing, but none of this conduct constituted a materially adverse change in working 
conditions sufficient to state a claim of disparate treatment); Gorence v. Eagle Food Ctr., Inc., 
242 F.3d 759, 766 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that the loss of secretarial support and change in title 
from Human Relations Manager to Human Relations Specialist did not constitute an adverse 
employment action where such action did not involve the loss of pay or benefits); Walker v. 
Thompson, 214 F.3d 615, 629 (5th Cir. 2000) (fact that employer took a major account away 
from employee and prevented employees from taking breaks together did not amount to an 
adverse employment action required to establish a retaliation claim); Kerns, 178 F.3d at 1017 
(holding that allegations that supervisor criticized the plaintiff, took away her discretionary 
authority, relocated her office, and ceased reimbursing her for work~related expenses were 
insufficient to constitute an adverse employment action where plaintiff failed to show that these 
actions had a fonnal effect on her employment status or potential for job advancement); Watts 
v. Kroger Co., 170 F.Jd 505, 511-12 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that allegations that employer 
changed employee's work schedule and asked employee to perfonn new tasks after she filed a 
complaint about her supervisor did not rise to the level of an adverse employment action 
because neither the change in schedule nor new tasks affected employee's salary; there is not 
adverse employment action where pay, benefits, and level of responsibility remain the same). 
11. Hilt-Dyson v. City of Chicago, 282 F.3d 456,465-66 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 
• 
U.S. 820 (2002) (finding that supervisor's uniforn1 inspection of female officer in an allegedly 
harassing and humiliating manner did not constitute adverse employment action absent evidence 
that the inspection resulted in reduction in pay or diminution in job responsibilities, or that 
harassing conduct was so severe as to be actionable harassment); Rizzo v. Sheahan, 266 F.Jd 
705,717-18 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding that "[t]hreats, phone calls, and inconveniences that county 
employee allegedly faced after she filed sexual harassment complaint did not alter terms or 
conditions of her employment" sufficiently to meet "adverse employment" employment 
standard); Scusa v. Nestle U.S.A. Co., 181 F.3d 958, 969 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that 
allegations of an employee's ostracism were not sufficient to rise to the level of an adverse 
employment action, even where employee was forced to request a transfer to avoid coworker 
retaliation, because employee suffered no diminution in title, salary, or benefits); Allen v. Mich. 
Dep't of Corr., 165 F.3d 405,410 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that supervisor's alleged references 
to employee's use of racial epithets and employer's close monitoring of employee did not 
constitute adverse employment action). 
12. See Stewart, 275 F.3d at 1135-36 (finding that federal employee who was made to 
appear to be involved in obstruction of justice did not state a claim for actionable retaliation 
where there was no evidence of any adverse employment action created by officials' 
misconduct); Chock v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 113 F.3d 861,865 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that 
because neither taking outside M.B.A. classes nor living with a direct supervisor are ''benefits 
of employment," employer's alleged interference with both failed to demonstrate an adverse 
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actions, and courts nevertheless fail to examine the ·aggregate impact on the 
employee. 13 When the motive for these actions is impermissible 
discrimination or retaliation, the letter and spirit of Title VII have been 
violated. 14 The Supreme Court, in a case involving religious discrimination, 
employment action); Nelson v. Upsala Coli., 51 F.3d 383, 387 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Although '[t]he 
connection with employment need not necessarily be direc~' it does not further the purpose of 
Title VII to apply section 704 to conduct unrelated to an employment relationship.") (quoting 
Lutcher v. Musicians Union Local47, 633 F.2d 880,883 (9th Cir. 1980)) (alteration in original) 
(citation omitted); Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 493 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding that the 
disparate treatment provision in Title Vll only reaches employment impainnents and not events 
subsequent to and unrelated to plaintiffs employment). 
13. See, e.g., Stutler v. lll. Dep't ofCorr., 263 F.3d 698, 702-04 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding 
that plaintiffs alleged retaliatory lateral transfer to another office was not an adverse 
employment action despite her dislike of the new job because there was "no evidence that the 
transfer decreased her responsibilities or benefits in any way"; further, negative perfonnance 
reviews, change in job title, increased commute, supervisor's sending of a disparaging e-mail 
to boss, telling employee that she had to go and that she should move her workspace to 
unfinished reception area, and requesting employee to return her key to supervisors, did not 
cumulatively create an adverse employment action for a retaliation claim where conduct did not 
materially harm employee; to be actionable, adverse employment action must be a significant 
change in employment status or a decision causing a significant change in benefits); Hoffnlan-
Dombrowski v. Arlington Int'l Racecourse, Inc., 254 F.3d 644,653-54 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that employee's changing work schedule, secretly videotaping employee, issuing him a warning 
for having unauthorized people in the manager's office, and ordering him to spend more time 
with one of the discriminating officials did not constitute material adverse action for purposes 
of retaliation complaint); Kerns, 178 F.3d at l 017 (finding allegations that supervisor criticized 
plaintiff, took away her discretionary authority, relocated her office, and ceased reimbursing her 
for work -related costs were insufficient to constitute an adverse employment action where there 
was no showing that actions had a forrnal effect on plaintiffs employment status or potential 
for job advancement); Flannery v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 425,427-28 (8th Cir. 
1998) (affirnring summary judgment for employer because employer's conduct in ordering 
employee to remove fan from her desk, changing her work hours, reprimanding her for a dress 
code violation, moving her parking space, reassigning her work station, and removing 
complimentary letters from her personnel file did not constitute adverse employment action); 
Mattern, 104 F.3d at 705-07 (finding that employee who alleged retaliation in the form of 
harassment by supervisors and coworkers, poor evaluations, and threats of terrnination failed 
to state a claim under Title vm; Rabinovitz v. Pena, 89 F.3d 482, 486-89 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(finding that retaliation consisting of lowered perforn1ance rating that resulted in the loss of a 
$600 bonus, restrictions on speech with coworkers, implementation of a requirement that the 
employee report to supervisor upon leaving or returning to the office, loss of secretarial 
assistance for typing, and twenty-minute restriction on breaks was not actionable). 
14. One of the purposes of the 1991 amendment to Title Vll was to clarify that whenever 
an employee presents evidence that illegal motive played a part in an employment decision, 
liability should be found. See discussion of Price Waterhouse, infra notes 50-52 and 
accompanying text. In the context of a claim of discrimination under the ADA, the Eleventh 
Circuit reasoned that "[a]n artificially high threshold for what constitutes an adverse 
employment action would undennine the purposes of the statute by pernlitting discriminatory 
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explained that "[t]he emphasis of both the language and the legislative history 
of the statute is on eliminating discrimination in employment; similarly 
situated employees are not to be treated differently solely because they differ 
with respect to race, color,-religion,-sex, or national origin."15 If the action 
taken by the employer is truly inconsequential, it will be difficult for an 
employee to prove bias; however, where the evidence indicates that the 
employer is basing its decisions on impertnissible discrimination or retaliation, 
liability should attach, and the severity of the action should be addressed 
solely at the remedy stage. 
Title VII was amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to create a damage 
remedy for the emotional distress caused by the intentionally discriminatory 
or retaliatory conduct of employers. 16 Congress rec_ognize_d that equal 
employment opportunity cannot be achieved where workers are subjected to 
different terms and conditions of employment, or face retaliatory treatment, 
but are remediless because they cannot prove out-of-pocket losses. 17 A 
growing body of law has ignored the significance of this amendment. 18 
Indeed, many courts are sending a message to employers and their supervisors 
actions to escape scrutiny.'' Doe v. DeKalb County Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1453 n.21 (11th 
Cir. 1998). The court reasoned that where the motive for the employer's action is clearly the 
employee's disability, dismissing a claim because the employer's action doesn't rise to the level 
of an adverse employment action ''means that the action is not scrutinized_ for discrimination." 
I d. 
15. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 71 (1977). 
16. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102·166, 105 Stat. 1074 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e (2000)). 
17. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1), at 18,65 (1991); 137 CONG. REc. S15388-01 (daily ed. 
Oct. 29, 1991) (statementofSens. DaschleandBreaux); 137 CONG.REC. Sl8336-02 (dailyed. 
Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum). See also Schobert v. Illinois Department of 
Transportation, 304 F.3d 725 (7th Cir. 2002), which held that plaintiffs may recover in a Title 
Vll suit provided that they demonstrate injury, even if there are no monetary damages and only 
nominal compensation is awarded, because a civil rights plaintiff may act as a "'privateattomey 
general vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest importance~'" /d. at 731 
(quoting Dunning v. Simmons Airlines, Inc .• 62 F.3d 863, 873 n.13 (7th Cir. 1995)). Thus, 
employment discrimination '"testers' ... [have] standing to sue ... even if they [are] not 
interested in employment" because it is discrimination or unequal treatment that allows plaintiffs 
to recover. ld. (quoting Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., 222 F.3d 289, 298 (7th Cir. 
2000)). 
18. It has been noted that the majority of decisions construing the "adverse action" element 
in retaliation claims have in fact used the stricter standard since the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
was enacted. See Donna Smith Cude & Brian M. Steger, Does Justice Need Glasses? Unlawful 
Retaliation Under Title VII Following Mattern: Will Courts Know It When They See It·?, 14 
LAB. LAw. 373-, 382 ( 1998). Prior to this law, the penalties were not substantial; thus, the issue 
did not draw the same attention. See id. at 379 n.32. See also cases· infra note 28, which 
demonstrate this recent trend. 
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that they can discriminate with impunity, provided that their conduct does not 
reach a particularly egregious or materially adverse level. The circuits are 
divided as to whether any of the aforementioned types -of misconduct are 
actionable under Title VII, and oftentimes the courts erroneously treat the 
question of harm the same, regardless of whether the case is one of disparate 
treatment or retaliation. 19 
Although the words are not found in the text of Title Vll, several courts 
now require, as part of a prima facie case alleging disparate treatment, that an 
employee prove a_ materially adverse employment action~20 a tangible 
19. Decisions from several circuits cite a mixture of disparate tteatment and retaliation 
cases. See, e.g,, Tarshis v. Riese Org.,-211 F.3d 30, 38 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing demotion cases 
as illustrative of disparate treatment); Richardson v~ N.Y. State Dep'tofCorr. Serv., 180 F.3d 
426, 446 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing disparate treatment cases in holding that an adverse employment 
action must affect terms, conditions, or privileges of employment to be actionable retaliation); 
Hemandez.:Torres v. Intercont'l Trading, Jnc., 158 F.3d 43, 47 (lst Cir. 1998) (citing both 
retaliation and disparate treatment eases in deternlining that an increase in the amount of 
electronic messages containing onerous assignments and critical reports regarding employee's 
productivity was not an adverse employment action); Munday v. Waste Mgmt. ofN. Am., 126 
F.3d 239,243 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that, for retaliation claims, the adverse-action must affect 
terms, conditions, or benefits of employment, and instructing employees to ignore and spy on 
plaintiff was not an adverse employment action); Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 
1300-01 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that adverse employment action required for a prima facie case 
of retaliation incorporates same requirement that conduct rise to the level of a violation of 42 
U.S.C. -§ 2000e-2(a)(l) or (2), and oral reprimands and derogatory remarks do not rise to the 
level of an adverse employment action); Randlett v. Shalala, 118_·F.3d -857, 862 (1st Cir. 1997) 
(finding that even though the retaliation provision is not limited to ''terms, conditions,-or 
privileges" of employment, the court would incorporate this reference as a qualifier of retaliation 
claims because a broad interpretation may encourage employees who are "aggrieved by slights" 
to file "whimsical claims"); Yerdon v. Henry, 91 F.3d 370,378 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that for 
retaliation claims to be actionable, an adverse employment action must, as in the case of 
disparate treatment claims, affect "'the terms, privileges, duration, or conditions of 
employment,'" and the action must be a materially adverse change in tenns and conditions of 
employment) (quoting Johnson v. Frank, 828 F. Supp. 1143, 1153 (S.D.N.Y 1993)). Decisions 
within the Seventh Circuit appear to be split on the question. Compare Knox v. Indiana, 93 
F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir.l996) ("There is nothing in the law of retaliation that restricts the type 
of retaliatory act that might be visited upon an employee who seeks to invoke her rights by filing 
a complaint"), with Sweeney v. West, 149 F.3d 550, SSS (7th Cir. 1998) (equating the adverse 
action requirement in retaliation with that required for claims brought under the disparate 
treatment provision), and Rabinovitz v. Pena, 89 F.3d 482, 488 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that 
an alleged adverse employment action in a retaliation case must materially change the terms and 
. . 
conditions of employment). 
20. Policastro v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 297 F. 3d 535, 539 (6th Cir. 2002). Policastro 
held that, to make outa prima facie case of discriminatiQn, a plaintiff must allege "a 'materially 
adverse change in the terms or conditions of .•. employment."' Jd. (quoting Kocsis v. Multi~ 
CareMgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876,885 (6thCir. 1996)). Further, ''[r]eassignments without changes 
in salary, benefits, title, or work hours usually do not constitute adverse employment actions." 
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employment action, 21 or an ultimate employment action. 22 These c.ourts have 
/d. The court also stated that "reassignment [will] rise[] to the level of a constructive 
discharge," and thus be actionable, only if the conditions are "objectively intolerable to a 
reasonable person." /d. Other cases have also addressed the requirement of a materially adverse 
employment action. See, e.g., Traylor v. Brown, 295 F.3d 783, 788-90 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(requiring that, to establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must do more than show she was 
treated differently than other employees, but rather, must prove that ''she suffered a materially 
adverse employment action ... 'more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of 
job responsibilities"') (quQting Rabinovitz, 89 F.3d at 488); Weeks v ~New York State (Div. of 
Parole), 273 F.3d 76, 86-87 (2d Cir. 2001) (affirming the district court's granting of a motion 
to dismiss because alleged claims, which included filing a grievance, a notice of discipline and 
a counseling memo, and transferring plaintiff to another office failed to state a prima facie case 
that she suffered "material" harm to a term, condition or privilege of employment), abrogated 
on other grounds by Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002); Holtz v. 
Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 84 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that allegations that the employee's 
supervisor and several coworkers forrned a clique and made her feel '"out of the loop'" fell 
"short of the sort of 'materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment' 
[actionable] qnder Title Vll") (quoting Richardson, 180 F.3d at 446); Harlston v. McDonnell-
Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that "[c]hanges in duties or working 
conditions that cause no materially significant disadvantage ... are insufficient to establish the 
adverse conduct required to make out a prima facie case"); Crady v. Liberty Nat' I Bank & Trust 
Co. of Ind., 993 F.2d 132, 135 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding that a "materially adverse e_mployment 
action'' is an element of a prima facie case under Title VII). 
21. Longstreet v. Dl. Dep't of Corr., 276 F.3d 379~ 383-84 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
employee's "negative performance evaluations and [the requirement that she] substantiate ... 
her absences from work [as] illness-related" were not "tangible job consequences and there-
fore ... not adverse employment actions ... under Title Vll"); Oest v. lll. Dep't of Corr., 240 
F.Jd 605, 612-13 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding that neither unfavorable perfortnance evaluations nor 
oral or written r~primands sufficiently implicated tangible job consequences, even though 
"each . . . reprimand brought [the plaintiff] closer to termination,, absent evidence of any 
"immediate consequence of the reprimands"); Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1300 (requiring that 
retaliation must be 'langible enough to alter an employee's compensation, terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment"). 
22. Soledad v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 304 F.3d 500,507 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating 
that a "lateral transfer •.. with no change in pay is not the type of ultimate employment action 
necessary for an adverse employment action in a retaliation claim") (citation omitted); 
Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that even though the 
"action complained of may have had a tangential effect on [plaintiffs] employment, [the 
employer's action must] rise to the level of an ultimate employment decision to be actionable 
under Title Vll''); Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding 
that only "ultimate employment decisions" are actionable); see also LaCroix v. Sears, Roebuck, 
& Co., 240 F.3d 688, 691-92 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that, even if employee received a poor 
perfonnance review as a result of her report of sexual harassment, "a negative review is 
actionable only where the employer subsequently uses the evaluation as a basis to detrimentally 
alter the tenns or conditions of the recipient's employment"); Cross v. Cleaver, 142 F.3d 1059, 
1073 (8th Cir. 1998) (requiring that in order to make out a prima facie case ofretaliation, the 
employee must suffer an '11ltimate employment decision"). Note, however, that a Fourth Circuit 
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asserted that not every employment decision that arguably affects the tertns 
and conditions of employment is actionable under Title Vll.23 They have 
panel has asserted that "while the Eighth Circuit has ostensibly adopted the 'ultimate 
ernployment decision' standard, it has consiStently applied a broader standard.,' VonGunten 
v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 864(4th Cir~ 2001). It would appear, however, thatthemostrecent 
Eighth Circuit decisions lean towards the stricter standard. 
The requirement ofan ultimate employment decision first appeared in a Fourth Circuit case, 
Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1981) (en bane), where a black postal employee brought 
a disparate-treatment case alleging that the Postal Service's failure to include female or minority 
workers on his review committee, in violation of its own internal guide! ines, gave rise to a prima 
facie Title VII violation. Id~ at 228. The court explained that Title VII does not prohibit 
"interlocutory or mediate decisions having no immediate effect upon employment conditions,, 
and that the composition of a review committee falls into this category. /d. at 233. Thus, the 
F~urth Circuit was describing a situation where the employer took no action against the 
plaintiff-employee. Further, the court was interpreting the unique statutory language in 
section 717regarding federal employees, which forbids only discriminatory ''personnel" actions. 
/d. The Fifth Circuit nonetheless adopted the Page "ultimate decision" language and applied 
it to a retaliation claim in Do/lis v. Reuben, 11 F.3d 777 (Sth Cir. 1995). Dol/is found that 
retaliatory actions which restricted opportunities for promotion, prohibited the plaintiff from 
attending a training conference, and gave the plaintiff false information about aspects of her 
employment, including allocation of travel funds, did not give rise to an actionable retaliation 
claim. /d. at 781-82. The Do/lis court reasoned that Title VII covers only ultimate employment 
decisions and not employer decisions that "arguably might have some tangential effect upon 
those ultimate decisions." /d. 
Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., l 04 F .3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997), is viewed as the seminal case 
establishing_ that an ultimate employment decision is necessary in orderfor plaintiff to make out 
a prima facie case of retaliation. In that case the plaintiff complained that she was reprimanded 
for not being at her work station while she was at the Human Resources Department discu_ssing 
her hostile work environment claim. /d. at 105. Additionally, coworkers, allegedly with the 
approval of Eastrnan supervisors, acted in a hostile fashion towards plaintiff, and she began to 
receive negative evaluations from supervisors who had previously praised her work, resulting 
in the loss of a pay increase. /d. The requirement that only ultimate employment decisions are 
cognizable under Title VII is supported by the Fifth Circuit's citation to earlier U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions that involved ultimate employment decisions; however, the Supreme Court 
never suggested that an "ultimate employment decision" was necessary. I d. at 71 0 (Dennis, J., 
dissenting); see also Ernest F. Lidge, The Meaning of Discrimination: Why Courts Have Erred 
in Requiring Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs to Prove that the Employer's Action was 
Materially Adverse or Ultimate, 47 U. KAN. L. REv. 333J 363 ( 1999). Professor Lidge criticizes 
the Fourth Circuit's Page decision, that Title VII reaches only "ultimate employment actions." 
He asserts that the court's reliance on Supreme Court precedent is misdirected, id. at 361-64, 
and the-fallacy is compounded when the Fifth Circuit, in Mattern, relies on Page to reach the 
same conclusion. Jd. at 367 & n.20 1. 
23. These courts have reasoned thatsimply because employer conduct makes an employee 
unhappy, this is not enough to assert a claim of adverse -employment action; otherwise, any 
~'chip-on-the·shoulder employee'' could bring an action based on minor incidents. Robinson, 
120 F.3d at 1300. The counterargument is that most employees would be unwilling to initiate 
action with the EEC>C, subject themselves to investigation, and jeopardize their work status 
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indiscriminately borrowed terminology from the U.S. Supreme Court's sexual 
harassment cases to impose unwarranted obstacles on employees seeking to 
hold their employers liable.24 Other courts have established broad mechanical 
rules as to what types of adverse action will and will not qualify, failing to 
recognize the fact-sensitive nature of the question.25 Indeed, some circuits 
have required employees to demonstrate a "serious and material change" in 
terms and conditions of employment to survive sununary judgment.26 These 
based on merely "minor inconveniences," which would net them nominal damages. Further, 
it is likely that employers can readily address "minor incidents" and remedy the problem in an 
expeditious fashion without judicial involvement. 
24. See, e.g., Watson v. Norton, 10 Fed. Appx. 669, 678 (lOth Cir. 2001) (referring to 
tangible employment action definition in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 
. . ( 1998), in deterntining viability of a section 704 retaliation claim); Evans v. City of Houston, 
246 F.3d 344, 353 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Ellerth as a basis for finding adverse action under 
section 704); Boone v. Goldin, 178 F.3d 253, 255-56 (4th Cir. 1999) (analogizing to sexual 
harassment claims and citing to Ellerth in defining the adverse employment action requirement 
in a retaliation case). The requirement that an adverse employment action be "tangible" is 
borrowed from the Faragher!Ellenh mandate that courts may impose strict vicarious liability 
on an employer for the sexually harassing conduct of a supervisor only if the supervisor has 
subjected the employee to a tangible job action, characterized as an official act of the company. 
Faragherv. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,788 (1998); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761. The confusion is 
generated, perhaps, because the Ellenh court cited various disparate treatment cases in 
suggesting that a tangible job action should be "a significant change in employment status, such 
as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, 
or a decision causing a significant change in benefits," followed by a string of cites to the 
ADEA, the ADA, and Title VII disparate treatment cases. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761. This 
ignores, however, the Ellenh Court's conclusion that even if a tangible employment action is 
not present, a plaintiff may still prevail under the disparate treatment provision; the existence 
of the tangible employment action simply removes any affinnative defense on the part of the 
employer. /d. at 765. 
25. See, e.g., Stutler v. Dl. Dep't of Corr., 263 F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating that 
negative performance evaluations, job title changes, greater travel distance to work and/or the 
loss of a telephone or workstation do not qualify, standing alone, as an adverse employment 
action). Compare the more expansive definition suggested by Judge Posner in Hermreiter v. 
Chicago Housing Authority, 315 F.3d 742 (7th Cir. 2002). Although rejecting claims involving 
a "purely subjective preference for one position over another,'' the judge recognized that the 
adverse action requirement is met whenever financial terms of employment are diminished, a 
transfer significantly reduces career prospects, the job is changed in some other way that injures 
the employee's career, or where working conditions are changed so as to cause a "significantly 
negative alteration in [the] workplace environment." ld. at 744-45. 
26. See Bell v. EPA, 232 F.3d 546, 554-55 (7th Cir. 2000) (fmding that allegations of 
demeaning assignments, verbal abuse, surveillance, diminished responsibilities, and being 
assigned tasks doomed to failure did not comprise material adverse actions sufficient to survive 
summary judgment); see also Flannery v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 425,427-28 (8th 
Cir. 1998). In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U~S. 506 (2002), the Court cautioned that the 
requirements of a prima facie case may vary depending on the context and that the elements 
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restrictions have also been imposed in retaliation cases, despite the fact that 
Title VII expressly prohibits all retaliatory discrimination, without reference 
to the terms and conditions of employment.27 Further, this analysis ignores the 
different policy concerns reflected in the antidiscrimination and antiret~iation 
provisions, the latter having been enacted to protect those who invoke Title 
Vll's enforcement machinery.28 More generally, regardless of whether the 
employee alleges discrimination or retaliation, the "de minimis" wrongdoing 
notion is ill-founded. Even assuming that a disadvantageous personnel action 
inflicts only minimal hann, this goes to the issue of dat11ages, not liability. 
Despite the analytical confusion, the one emerging trend is that the lower 
courts are imposing a heavier burden on Title VII plaintiff-employees, even 
at the prima facie case stage. 29 This Article exposes the analytical confusion 
uwere 'never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.'" /d. at 512 (quoting Fumco 
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)). 
27. Section 703 specifically limits claims to adverse action that involves "compensation, 
tenns, conditions, or privileges of employment," whereas the plain language of section 704 
prohibits any disaimination. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, many 
courts have superimposed the ''tenns and conditions" requirement on plaintiffs asserting a claim 
under the retaliation provision. See, e.g., Weeks v. New York State (Div. of Parole), 273 F.3d 
76, 87 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that an employee fails to state a claim for retaliation where she 
does not allege what tangible adverse effect her transfer had on the tenns and conditions of her 
employment), abrogated on other grounds by Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan; 536 U.S. 
101 (2002); Ribando v. United Airlines, 200 F.3d 507, 511-12 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that 
retaliatory conduct must be "materially" adverse to be actionable); Hollins v. Atlantic Co., 188 
F.3d 652, 662 (6th Cir. 1999) (requiring that a plaintiff "identify a materially adverse change 
in the terms and conditions of his employment to state a claim for retaliation under Title Vll"); 
Munday v. Waste Mgmt. ofN. Am., 126 F.3d 239,243 (4th Cir. 1997) (requiring that adverse 
action for retaliation claims must affect terms, conditions, or benefits of employment); 
Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1300-01 (finding that the '"adverse employment action' element of ... 
a prima facie case [of retaliation] incorporates the same requirement, that the retaliatory conduct 
rise to the level of a violation" of section 703); Ton·es v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 640 (2d Cir . 
. 
1997) (requiring that a plaintiff show "'a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions 
of employment'" for an actionable retaliation claim) (quoting McKenney v. New York City Off-
Track Betting Corp., 903 F. Supp. 619,623 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)); Yerdon v. Henry, 91 F.3d 370, 
378 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that, as in the case of disparate treatment claims, retaliation 
claimants must demonstrate that the conduct affected ''terms, privileges, duration, or conditions 
of employment," and the action must be a materially adverse change in terms and conditions of 
employment). 
28. See infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text. 
29. For example, the Seventh Circuit in Knox v. Indiana, 93 F .3d 1327 (7th Cir. 1996), held 
that demeaning statements made by other employees potentially qualify as adverse employment 
action. /d. at 1334. The court noted that adverse actions include 
actions like moving [a] person from a spacious, brightly lit office to a dingy closet, 
depriving the person of previously available support services ... or cutting off 
challenging assignments .... The law deliberately does not take a "laundry list" 
• 
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regarding what harms are actionable under Title Vll, including the failure of 
courts to distinguish disparate treatment, sexual harassment, and retaliation 
claims. Most significantly, this Article seeks to critique the trend that has 
made it exceedingly difficult for employees to bring Title VTI claims. Neither 
the statutory language of Title Vll nor current Supreme Court precedent 
justifies the onerous burden that lower courts are imposing on employees who 
are subjected to discriminatory or retaliatory treatment. Part II explores 
discriminatory treatment cases and demonstrates how the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the "tertns and conditions" language in Title Vll sexual 
.harassment cases should be used in analyzing the harm question in the context 
of other disparate treatment cases. Part m demonstrates the failure of the 
lower courts to distinguish retaliation claims despite the fact that both the 
statutory language and the intended purpose of the provision demonstrate the 
need for a different and more liberal interpretation of the harm question, 
borrowing from traditional First Amendment retaliation cases. Part N 
focuses on the different types of ,employment actions set forth in this 
approach to retaliation, because unfortunately its forms are as varied as the human 
imagination will pennit. 
/d. In Traylor v. Brown, 295 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2002), the court ruled that to make out a prima 
facie case a plaintiff must do more than show that she was treated differently than other 
employees, but instead must prove that she suffered a "materially adverse employment 
action ... 'more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities."' 
ld. at 788-90 (quoting ·Rabinovitz v. Pena, 89 F.3d 482, 488 (7th Cir. 1996)). See also the 
Seventh Circuit cases discussed supra note 21, wherein the court required retaliatory conduct 
to be '"tangible'' in order to be actionable. Although the First Circuit has construed the adverse 
action element broadly, see. e.g., Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1994), 
the court more recently in Randlett v. Shalala; 118 F.3d 857 (1st Cir. 1997), detennined that 
even though section 704(a) is not limited to "tenns, conditions, or privileges of employment'' 
like the antidiscrimination provision, the court would nonetheless incorporate by reference this 
restriction into the adverse action detennination in a retaliation claim. ld. at 862. The court 
ultimately concluded that an employer's refusal to transfer an employee after the employee filed 
an EEOC complaint is not automatically outside of Title Vll' s protection. /d. Similarly, 
decisions from the D.C. Circuit appeared to broadly construe the adverse action requirement, 
at least in cases involving retaliation. See, e.g., Paquin v. Fed. Nat' I Mortgage Ass'n, 119 F.3d 
23, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding that "withdrawal of a voluntary benefit ... may constitute [an] 
adverse [employment] action"). However. recent decisions now mandate showing "materially 
adverse consequences affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of ... employment or ... 
future employment opportunities" in order to state a claim. E.g., Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d446, 
456-57 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (relying on Ellerth 's citation to decisions that applied a "materiality" 
threshold to determine whether the employment action constituted a tangible job action); see 
also White, supra note 3, at 1124 (noting the increased trend imposing heightened harm 
requirements and suggesting that this "may well be a reaction to the explosion of employment 
discrimination claims crowding the dockets of the federal courts"). 
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Introduction and suggests the proper analysis using the principles identified 
in Parts IT and ill. 
II. Discriminatory Treatment Claims 
Section 703(a) of Title Vll defines an "unlawful employment practice" as 
any activity by an employer that discriminates against an individual "with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."30 
This text, with its broad reference to "terms, conditions, or privileges" of 
employment, would appear to encompass discriminatory transfers, negative 
evaluations, temporary suspensions or demotions, increased workloads, or the 
elimination of secretarial or other equipment, as well as company-tolerated 
harassment or hostility. The text does not restrict the Act to "tangible 
employment actions" or "ultimate employment actions." 
Further, lower courts that have imposed these onerous burdens on 
employees do not write on a clean slate. The U.S. Supreme Court, in the 
context of sexual harassment cases, has defined the phrase "compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" broadly to protect employees 
who are subjected to sexual harassment at work.31 In addition, Congress 
amended the Act in 1991 to recognize a remedy for emotional distress 
damages that occur even in the absence of a tangible or ultimate employment 
action.32 
It is likely that at least some of the confusion in the lower courts stems from 
a misreading of the Supreme Court's analysis in its sexual harassment cases. 33 
In Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,34 the Court distinguished situations 
where a supervisor's harassment culminates in a "tangible" employment 
decision where an employer faces absolute vicarious liability from cases 
in which the employee is subjected to a hostile work environment where 
30. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a), 78 Stat. 241, 255. 
31. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). 
32. See supra notes 16 .. 17 and accompanying text. 
33. See, for example, Brown, where the court, in a case addressing disparate treatment and 
retaliation claims, borrowed Ellerth 's use of a "materiality" threshold. Brown, 199 F .3d at 456 .. 
57. The Ellerth Court used materiality to set a bar for sexual harassment claims, not to impose 
new restrictions on litigating other Title Vll claims. The court concluded that an alleged 
retaliatory negative perfonnance evaluation "may have been lower than nonnaJ, [but] it was not 
adverse in an absolute sense." /d. at 458. This is in contrast to a prior decision wherein a court 
in the same circuit concluded that a negative perforn1ance evaluation in reprisal for engaging 
in EEO activity was actionable even absent a denial of a promotion or other economic harm. 
Smith v. Sec'y of the Navy, 659 F.2d 1113, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
34. 524 u.s. 742 (1998). 
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an employer may assert an affrrmative defense to liability.35 In defining a 
"tangible" action for which absolute vicarious liability attaches, the Court 
stated that the plaintiff-employee must prove the supervisor's "action 
constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, ftring, 
failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, 
or a decision causing a significant change in benefits."'36 However, the Court 
recognized that even where the supervisor's harassment does not culminate in 
the loss of one of these types of tangible job benefits, there is still liability, in 
fact vicarious liability, although this may be avoided if the employer 
establishes all of the elements of a rigorous affrrrnative defense. 37 The Court's 
analysis in Ellerth, therefore, makes it clear that requiring the loss of "tangible 
job benefits''38 or an "ultimate employment action"39 to prove a Title Vll 
violation is nrisguided.40 
35. /d. at 761-63. 
36. /d. at 761-62. The difficulty in interpreting the level of hann necessary ·to create a 
prima facie case manifests itself not only in Title Vll actions but also under other employment 
discrimination statutes. See~ e.g~, Garcia v~ Pueblo Country Club, 299 F.3d 1233, 1241 (lOth 
Cir. 2002) (opting for a case-by-case approach to determine whether a given employment action 
is sufficiently adverse to survive summary judgment in ·the context of claims brought under the 
ADEA and§ 1981). 
37. In Faragherv. City of Boca Raton~ 524 U.S. 775 (1998), the Court ruled that although 
~'[a]n employer is subjec:t to vicarious liability ... for [a] hostile [work] environment created 
by a supervisor," an employer may raise an affirmative defense based on his exercise of 
reasonable care "to prevent and correct" harassing conduct and based on the reasonableness of 
the employee's efforts to prevent harm. Id. at 807. The Court adopted the vicarious liability 
standard based on the theory that supervisors are "significantly aided by the agency relationship 
in committing the harassment." ld. at 793, 801-03. On the other hand, the Court recognized 
that the affirmative defense would promote Title VII's goal by encouraging employers to 
implement sexual harassment policies. /d. at 806-07. Further, requiring employees_ to utilize 
internal policies reflects Title Vll' s mandate that victims of discrimination are under a statutory 
duty to mitigate damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), which provides that a back pay award 
shall be reduced by "amounts earnable with reasonable diligence." See also Ford :Motor Co. 
v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 233 (1982). Thus, a defending employer may raise an affirmative 
defense, subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8(c) which requires the employer to prove that "[it] exercised reasonable care to 
prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior and . . . that the employee 
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by 
the employer or to avoid harm otherwise." FEo.R.CIV.P.8(c);Faraghet, 524 U.S. at 807. See 
also infra Part ill for a discussion of the application of this affirmative defense to various types 
of discriminatory and retaliatory conduct. 
38. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 742. 
39. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). 
40., The Ray court noted that the tangible employment actions listed in Ellerth focused on 
the type of actions that ''would subject [an] employer to vicarious liability for [unlawful] 
harassment/' and it subsequently "reject[ed] the contention" that Ellerth established a standard 
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A careful reading of the Supreme Court's sexual harassment decisions 
provides important lessons for assessing the harm question in Title Vll 
actions. First, in cases not involving tangible job benefits, the Supreme Court 
has required that the harassment be objectively as well as subjectively 
• 
sufficient to alter the "terms and conditions of employment," but it has also 
stressed that courts must look to the totality of circumstances in assessing the 
work environment.41 Second, the Court has recognized the fact-specific nature 
of the harm question, leading several lower courts to assert that, in the gray 
area, the issue should be determined by a jury.42 'fhird, the Supreme Court has 
for what constitutes an adverse action in a retaliation case. /d. at 1242 n.5. 
41. See Harris v~ Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) ("[W]hether an environment 
is 'hostile' or 'abusive' can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances."). This 
principle was cited by the U.S. Supreme Court in Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 
U~S. 268, 270 (2001), and in Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787. See also Cerros v. Steel Tech., Inc., 
288 F.3d 1040, 1046-47 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that the district court erred in failing to 
consider the totality of the circumstances in assessing an employee's hostile work environment 
claim); Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 .F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding that 
the district court erred in focusing on a single factor, namely coworker harassment); Conner v. 
Schrader-Bridgeport Int'l, Inc .. , 227 F.3d 179, 195-96 (4th Cit. 2000) (holding that the district 
court improperly failed to look at the totality of circumstances in assessing whether harassment 
was sufficiently severe or pervasive :to crea:te a hostile work environment); Williams v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 562-64 (6th Cir~ 1999) (the totality-of-the-circumstances test 
requires the court to consider the total harassment by all perpetrators when deternlining whether 
a hostile work environment exists, and, the district court erred in failing to recognize that the_ 
impact of separate incidents may accumulate and thereby create a hostile work environment). 
42. See, e.g., McCowan v. All Star Maint., Inc., 273 F.3d 917, 923-24 (lOth Cir. 2001) 
(finding that the detennination of whether a hostile work environment exists is particularly 
unsuited for summary judgment because it raises a fact question and the trier of fact must 
examine the totality of circumstances); Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 75 (2d Cir. 
2001) (holding that "[s ]ummary judgment is appropriate only if it can 'be concluded as a matter 
of law that no rational juror could view [the defendant's conduct] as ... an intolerable alteration 
of [the plaintifrs] working conditions'") (quoting Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 
154 (2d Cir. 2000)) (alteration in original); Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 342-43 (2d Cir. 
1988) (finding that because a federal judge is not in the best position to interpret the "subtle 
sexual dynamics of the workplace," juries, not judges, should decide what is and is_ not proper 
in the workplace). In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000), the 
U.S. Supreme Court, in the context of an ADEA case,_ admonished an appellate-court not to 
second guess jury verdicts and not to substitute its judgment concerning the weight of the 
evidence for that of the jury. It emphasized that these same rules apply at the summary 
judgment stage. Jd. at 135; see also Conner221 F.3d at 199-200 (holding that the district court 
improperly intruded into the jury~ s province by reversing their verdict, especially in light of"the 
legal principle that whether the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a 
hostile work environment is 'quintessentially a question of fact' for the jury") (quoting Smith 
v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 243 (4th Cir. 2000));_ Bailey v. Runyon, 167 F.3d 466, 
469 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding that "because [t]here is no bright line between sexual harassment 
and merely unpleasant conduct[,] . . . a jury's decision must generally stand") (quoting 
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. . 
acknowledged that even in those cases where "tangible'' action is needed to 
impose absolute vicarious liability on an employer for its supervisor's 
conduct, the injury need not necessarily be economic.43 
These sarne principles apply in any disparate treatment case because courts 
are interpreting the same "terms and conditions of employment'; language of 
Title Vll that fortned the basis for the Supreme Court's sexual harassment 
decisions. To require an ultimate employment action or tangible job loss or 
economic injury to establish a prima facie case of discrimination is error. In 
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,44 the Supreme Court rejected the notion that 
Title Vll only applied to economic or tangible barriers. The Court stated that 
Hathaway v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1214, 1221 (8th Cir. 1997)) (alteration in original). 
43. Although in Ellerth the Court acknowledged that in most cases tangible job action must 
inflict "direct economic harm/' the Court did not make this a mandatory prerequisite. Ellerth, 
524 U.S~ at 761; see Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 295 F.3d 335, 346-48 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding 
that Faragher and Ellerth did not mandate direct economic harm as a basis for finding a 
tangible employment action, and thus an employer may be automatically liable where he bases 
decisions affecting terms and conditions of a subordinate's employment on the subordinate's 
submission to sexual demands); Green v. Adm'rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 284 F.3d 642, 654-55 
(5th Cir. 2002) (stating that although "Ellerth acknowledged that in most cases a tangible 
employment action inflicts economic hann," it is not required in all cases, and here it sufficed 
that the employee was demoted, even though the demotion was not accompanied by a change 
in pay, benefits~ or prestige); Johnson v. Booker T. Washington Broad. Serv., Inc., 234 F.3d 
501,513 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding that, although economic-harm is dispositive of the-tangible 
employment action question, in the absence of economic hann, the factfinder must assess 
whether a reasonable person would have found the transfer to constitute a tangible employment 
action); Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 153-54 (3d Cir. 1999) ("Although direct 
economic harm is an important indicator of a tangible-adverse employment action, it is not the 
sine qua non. If an employer's act substantially decreases an employee's earning potential and 
causes significant disruption in his or her working conditions, a tangible adverse employment 
action may be found', for purposes of Title VII.). On the other hand, -some courts have adopted 
a more stringent interpretation of a tangible employment action. See Susan Grover, After 
Ellerth: The Tangible Employment Action in Sexual Ha.rassment Analysis, 35 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 809 (2002) (arguing that lower courts have defined the tertn tangible employment 
action too narrowly, thus allowing defendants to invoke the affirmative defense contrary to the 
purposes of Title Vll). The author notes that the heightened injury requirements discussed in 
this Article, namely the need for material adversity or an ultimate employment action, have 
sometimes been used to interpret the tangible employment action requirement of Ellerth. ld. 
at 826-27. See also decisions holding that an employee cannot satisfy the adverse ,employment 
requirement by alleging "constructive discharge," this is, that the employer has made working 
conditions so intolerable that the employee feels compelled to resign. The circuits are split on 
the question of whether a "constructive discharge" constitutes a "tangible action," thereby 
precluding an employer from raising an affirmative defense to a sexual harassment action. See 
Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 452-54 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 803 (2003); 
Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., Inc-., 333 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2003). 
44. 477 u.s. 57 (1986). 
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"the language of Title Vll is not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible' 
discrimination. The phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' 
evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate 
treatment of men and women' in employment. "45 H a sexually harassing work 
environment constitutes discrimination with regard to the terms and conditions 
of employment, it is equally clear that other types of employment action, 
including transfers, negative evaluations, temporary suspensions, or changes 
in workload or work scheduling, should be actionable under Title Vll if 
motivated by imperntissible animus. The only question is whether the 
employer's conduct has affected the terms and conditions of plaintiffs 
employment. In contrast, the tangible employment action requirement in 
sexual harassment cases focuses on whether an agent of the employer has 
taken an official action against the plaintiff such that the court should impose 
strict vicarious liability. 46 
As the Court recognized in the sexual harassment context, the challenged 
conduct must be sufficient to alter the terms and conditions of employment. 
However, the proper inquiry should be whether a reasonable person in the 
same situation would view the action as disadvantageous, regardless of 
whether it can be characterized as tangible, ultimate, or materially harmful.47 
Applying this analysis, courts should find that most transfers, negative 
evaluations, changes in work schedules, suspensions, and other similar actions 
constitute an alteration in the terms and conditions of employment. Further, 
other than harassment, these are official acts that can only be taken by agents 
of the employer, and not by fellow employees.48 Thus, courts should hold 
45. /d. at 64 (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,707 
n.l3 (1978)). 
46. The Ellerthl Faragher Court adopted the tangible employment action requirement as a 
critical indicator that the harasser was misusing supervisory authority. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 
804. Unlike coemployees, only supervisors are empowered to subject their victims to "tangible" 
employment decisions. 
47. The law provides protection against frivolous suits by imposing an objective standard. 
See Cullom v. Brown, 209 F.3d 1035, 1041 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that "[t]he adversity of an 
employment action is judged objectively"); Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 457 (D.C. Cir. 
1999) (finding that employee must show objective hann rather than "[m]ere idiosyncracies of 
personal preference" to show adverse employment action). The Eleventh Circuit, in Doe v. 
DeKalb County School District, 145 F.3d 1441 (11th Cir. 1998), noted that it "found no case 
in this or any other circuit, in which a court explicitly relied on the subjective preferences of a 
plaintiff to hold that that plaintiff had suffered an adverse employment action." /d. at 1448. 
48. In Faragher, the U.S. Supreme Court, in discussing vicarious liability, referred to a 
"supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee." Faragher, 
524 U.S. at 807. In that case, one of the supervisors had authority to hire and fire while the 
other had authority to direct the day-to-day work activities of the plaintiff. Relying on 
Faragher, the EEOC adopted a policy guidance, which defines "supervisor" to include both an 
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employers liable; regardless of their negligence or knowledge of 
discrimination, and without the possibility of an affirmative defense.49 A 
court should assess the extent to which a supervisor's misconduct causes 
economic loss or emotional harm only at the damages stage. 
In addition to the statutory text and its 1991 amendment,-further evidence 
shows that Congress did not intend to insulate employers who take 
discriminatory action against their employees simply because the injury falls 
short of an ultimate, materially adverse, or tangible employment act. An apt 
analogy can be drawn to the so-called "mixed-motive" cases, where a plaintiff 
presents evidence that illegal motive played a part in the employment 
decision, but there is also evidence that the employer had an independent, 
individual with "authority to recommend tangible job decisionsn and an individual "who is 
authorized to direct another employee's day-to-day work activities." U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, NO. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: VICARIOUS EMPLOYER 
LIABD J"I'Y R>R UNlAWFUL HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS ( 1999), available at http-://www .eeoc. 
gov/policy/docs/hara.ssment.html [hereinafter EEOC, ENFoRCEMENT GUIDANCE]; see also Wyatt 
v. Hunt Plywood Co., 297 F.3d 405, 411-12 (5th Cir~ 2002) (finding that although harasser 
allegedly had low wage-earning capacity and could not directly hire or fire plaintiff, he had 
authority to direct plaintiffs daily activities, and in his deposition he described himself as a 
supervisor); Gawley v. Ind. Uni v., 276 F. 3d 301,310-11 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that although 
harasser was not the female police officer's "immediate or successively higher supervisor," he 
had the ability to initiate disciplinary action against her!! and, in general, "he was entrusted with 
powers that rendered [plaintiff] less likely to blow the whistle on him"); Dees v. Johnson 
Controls World Serv., Inc., 168 F.3d417,42l-22 (11th Cir~ 1999) (stating that, after Faragher, 
an employer can be held vicariously liable if: "( 1 )the supervisor holds such a high position in 
the company that he could be considered the employer's 'alter-ego'; (2) the harassment violates 
a nondelegable duty of the employer; (3) the supervisor use[ d) 'apparent authority' granted by 
the employer; or (4) the supervisor [was] aided in committing the harassment by the existence 
of [the] agency relationship") (citation omitted). But see Hall v. Bodine Elec. Co., 276 F.3d 
345, 355 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that ''the fact that an employer authorizes one employee to 
oversee aspects· of another employee's job performance does not establish" supervisory liability 
unless that person "possesses the authority to directly affect the terms and conditions of [the] 
victim's employment," and "[a]bsent an entrustment of at least some of this authority, an 
employee does not qualify as a supervisor for purposes [of] imputing liability to the employer'') 
(third alteration in original). 
49. ·The concept of strict liability stems from Title Vll' s statutory language, which makes 
employers liable for the acts of their agents. The .RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219( 1) 
(1994), as quoted in Ellerth, states that "[a] master is subject to liability for the torts ofhis 
servants committed while acting in the scopeoftheiremployment." Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 755-56 (1998). Decisions regarding transfers, work schedules, 
evaluations; etc., fit within this principle. The Court in Faragher detennined that supervisors 
who subject employees to a hostile work employment, but no tangible employment action, are 
presumptively aided by the agency relationship, but not necessarily so; thus the Court created 
the affinnative defense. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 789. However, hostile work environment 
harassment cases are the only exception to the rule of strict liability. 
• 
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legitimate motive for its conduct. The Supreme Court, in Price Waterhouse 
v. Hopkins, 5° held that an employer may avoid liability entirely by proving, 
"by a preponderance of the evidence ·that it would have made the same 
decision in the absence of [the] imperntissible motive."51 Congress promptly 
responded with the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which overruled Price 
Waterhouse, specifically stating that once an employee proves that an illicit 
criterion "was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though 
other factors also motivated the practice," that employer is liable, whether or 
not the ultimate decision would have been the same absent the 
discrimination. 52 The ·statute provides that where the employer demonstrates 
that she would have made the same .decision, relief will be limited to 
declaratory and injunctive relief, and fees and costs "directly attributable only 
to the pursuit of the claim;" however, damages or an injunction requiring 
reinstatement, promotion, hiring, or back wages are not available. 53 In short, 
a showing of mixed-motive affects remedy, not liability. The balance 
Congress struck in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 seeks to acknowledge liability 
where an employer acts with discriminatory motive without unduly rewarding 
an employee who has not suffered significant harm from that discrimination. 
Courts should strike a similar balance in cases where impermissible 
discrimination was a motivating factor in the employment decision. Where 
the employer has engaged in statutory wrongdoing but contends that the hann 
is de minimis, liability should be imposed, leaving the injury question for the 
damages phase of the trial. 
The U.S. Supreme Court engaged in a similar balance of the equities to 
resolve the question of how to treat "after-acquired" evidence of employee 
wrongdoing, which surfaces only after the adverse employment action is 
taken for example, where, through discovery, the employer learns that an 
employee lied on her initial application or engaged in some posthiring 
misconduct that would have resulted in ternrination. Some lower courts had 
ruled that such evidence may serve as a complete defense to a Title VII claim 
on the theory that an employee who was not initially entitled to a job or who 
engaged in conduct that would have been grounds for ter1nination has not been 
legally injured. 54 The Supreme Court has rejected this analysis, however. In 
50. 490 u.s. 228 (1989). 
51. Id. at 249-50. 
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000). 
53. Jd. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
54. In this case, for example, the Sixth Circuit affinned summary judgment for the employer 
because the "employer would have fired the plaintiff employee on the basis of the misconduct 
had it known of the misconduct." McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ' g Co., 9 F.3d 539,542-
43 (6th Cir. 1993); rev'd, 513 U.S. 352 (1995) (McKennon 1). 
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McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.,55 the Court ruled, in the 
context of an age discrimination case, that an employee discharged because 
of her age is not totally barred from recovery even though she engaged in 
conduct that would have resulted in her termination. 56 
The case arose under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 51 but the 
Supreme Court in McKennon relied heavily on the corrutton purposes and 
goals of Title Vll in reaching its conclusion. 58 The Court reasoned that after-
acquired evidence cannot provide a post hoc justification for employer 
misconduct. 59 Although it would be inequitable to require reinstatement of 
someone the employer would have tertttinated or never would have hired, such 
evidence becomes critical only in assessing relief. Thus, for example, the 
Supreme Court reasoned that a trial court should normally calculate back pay 
"from the date of the unlawful discharge to the date the new information was 
discovered."60 Similarly, in the context of employer misconduct that falls 
short of a tangible or ultimate employment action, an employer should not be 
pertnitted to escape liability entirely, but rather, a court should consider the 
exte-nt of the harm suffered by the employee in assessing da1nages. 
Another principle derived from the sexual harassment cases is that courts 
should look cumulatively to all of the adverse actions that an employee has 
been subjected to, rather than assessing each act of discriminatory treatment 
in isolation. The Supreme Court, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,61 stated 
that several factors should be considered in deciding whether an employee has 
been subjected to harassment in her work environment that has altered the 
terms and conditions of employment.62 The Court rejected the notion that a 
plaintiff had to prove severe psychological injury for the employer's 
wrongdoing to be actionable; instead, the Court deemed it sufficient that the 
employee reasonably perceived the work environment as hostile or abusive. 63 
The Court set forth the following factors to provide guidance to lower courts: 
"[1] the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; [2] its severity; [3] whether 
it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and 
[4] whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work 
55. 513 U.S. 352 (1995) (McKennon If). 
56. I d. at 356-57. 
57. 29 u.s.c. §§ 621-633 (2000). 
58. McKennon II, 513 U.S. at 358. 
59. /d. at 359-60. 
60. /d. at 362. 
61. 510 u.s. 17 (1993). 
62. I d. at 23. 
63. Id. at 22. 
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performance."64 The Court stated that this list is not exhaustive, and it 
recognized that the highly fact-sensitive nature of the inquiry defied the 
creation of "a mathematically precise test."65 
As to the last factor, which is critical in assessing the harm question, Justice 
Ginsburg, in a separate concurring opinion, stated that a dominant inquiry is 
"whether the discriminatory conduct has unreasonably interfered with the 
plaintiffs work performance.''66 An employer who denies an employee 
secretarial help, equipment, or access to inforrnation has engaged in 
discriminatory conduct that affects the employee's ability to do her job, and 
yet many courts have rejected claims that an employer intentionally interfered 
with an employee's job perforrnance as "inactionable."67 Further, a court 
should find that an employer who frequently engages in less severe 
discriminatory acts, such as altering work h.ours, giving an undeserved low 
performance evaluation, or increasing an employee's work load, has altered 
the terms and conditions of the employee's job, even if, in isolation, this 
conclusion could not be drawn.68 
The Supreme Court's sexual harassment cases also teach that, in 
deterrnining whether transfers, less favorable work shifts, temporary 
demotions, and other negative employment acts constitute a change in tenns 
and conditions of employment, a nuanced assessment of the facts in each 
particular case is necessary. The Court has rejected adoption of any fast 
64. /d. at 23. 
65. ld. at 22 (''This is not, and by its nature cannot be, a mathematically precise test."). 
66. ld. (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
67. See, e.g., Haugerud v. Amery Sch. Dist., 259 F.3d678, 691-92 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding 
allegations that employer "1) tried to force her to give up her custodial position, 2) told the male 
night custodians not to help female day custodians, 3) gave her additional responsibilities above 
what was expected of the male custodians, . . . and 4) intentionally interfered with the 
performance of her work duties" may have been harassing, but none of this conduct constituted 
a materially adverse change in working conditions sufficient to state a claim of disparate 
treatment); see also supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
68. See Shannon v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 292 F.3d 712, 716 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(finding that employer conduct falling short of an ultimate employment decision is still 
cognizable under Title VII, and although reassignment alone may not constitute adverse 
employment action, here the employee presented evidence that he was completely denied 
overtime and the denial was an alteration in his compensation, tenns, conditions, or privileges 
of employment that "reach[ ed] 'some threshold level of substantiality"'; although individually 
the actions of which employee complained may not have risen to the level of an adverse 
employment action, they did when considered collectively) (quoting Wideman v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th Cir. 1998)); Wideman, 141 F.3d at 1455-56 (looking 
cumulatively to alleged wrongdoing, which included improperly listing employee as a ''no-
show," reprimanding and suspending employee for one day, manager threatening to shoot 
plaintiff if she went above his head, and one of employee's supervisors delaying authorization 
for medical treatment; collectively, these acts constituted prohibited retaliation). 
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mechanical rules. 69 This demonstrates the inappropriateness of denying aj ury 
trial in close cases. Just as in the case of sexual harassment, it can be argued 
that the analysis of workplace discrimination should be left to juries.70 The 
Supreme Court in Harris explained that the relevant questions are: (1) 
whether the ''victim " ., . subjectively perceive[s] the environment to be 
abusive;" and (2) whether, objectively, a reasonable employee could conclude 
that she is being subjected to a discriminatory alteration of the terms and 
conditions of her employment.71 Many lower courts addressing claims of 
sexual harassment have cautioned that granting summary judgment is 
appropriate only if it can be concluded as a matter of law that no rationaljuror 
could view the defendant's conduct as an impennissible alteration of the 
plaintiffs working conditions. 72 Furtherntore, recent Supreme Court decisions 
express concern that lower court judges are impermissibly denying plaintiffs 
the right to a jury trial, particularly in the-context of employment discrimina-
tion claims. 73 
69. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22. 
70. In Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338 {2d Cir. 1998), the court reasoned that because 
federal judges usually live "in a narrow segment of the enonnously broad American socio-
economic spectrum," they generally lack "the current real-life experience required in 
interpreting subtle sexual dynamics ofthe workplace based on nuances, subtle perceptions, and 
implicit communications." /d. at 342. The court reasoned, therefore, that juries, not judges, 
should decide what is and is not proper in the workplace-. /d. at 342-43. 
71. Harris~ 510 U.S. at 21-22. 
72. See, e.g., Haugerud, 259 F~3d at 693-96 (holding that the district court erred in granting 
summary judgment where "a reasonable fact finder could [have found] that plaintiff was treated 
differently than her male coJJeagues because of her sex, in a manner that was both subjectively 
and objectively harassing; ,although none of the incidents were severe, they were "at a -sufficient 
level of pervasiveness to trigger liability," such as employer "plotting to give her job to a male 
custodian, increasing her duties in an attempt to make her quit, withholding necessary 
assistance, [and] hiding the tools necessary to do her job"); Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., 258 
F.3d 62, 75-76 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding genuine issues of fact as to whether the supervisor's. 
alleged "conduct crossed the line between 'boorish and inappropriate' behavior and actionable 
sexual harassment" and whether such ''conduct 'unreasonably interfere[d] with [employee's] 
work perforruance, u' precluding summary judgment) (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 
524 U.S. 775, 778 (1998)) (first alteration in original). 
73. In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000), the U.S. 
Supreme C.ourt admonished the Fifth Circuit for disregarding.evidence that supported an ADEA 
. . 
plaintiff's prima facie case . ·the court "impennissibly substituted its judgment concerning the 
weight of the evidence for the jury's." /d. at 153. Although the ease arose in the context of a 
court granting judgment as a matter of law,_ the Court explained that the same need to "draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party" applies in the context of summary 
judgment. /d. at I SO. Further, the Supreme Court has recently cautioned against imposing any 
heightened pleading standard with regard to employment discrimination complaints. In 
Swierkiewicz v. SoremaN.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), the Court ruled that a district court erred in 
requiring the "plaintiff to plead [specific] facts establishing a prima facie case" under the 
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Ill. Retaliation Claims 
The requirement that an employee point to an alteration' in the terms 'and 
conditions of employment to prove an unlawful employment practice does not 
appear in Title VII's prohibition of retaliation. Rather, section 704(a)(l) of 
the Act simply states that it is "an unlawful employment practice for an 
. 
employer to discriminate against any of his employees or ap.plicants for 
employment . . . because he has opposed any practice made ·an unlawful 
employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has ... participated in 
any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this 
subchapter~"74 Nonetheless, many courts have superimposed a requirement 
that the retaliatory conduct tangibly affect terms and conditions of 
employment in order to be actionable.75 The Fifth and Eighth Circuits have 
McDonnell-Douglas standard in order to avoid dismissal. /d. at 511. In McDonnell Douglas 
Corp~ v, Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Court .held that, to establish a prima facie case, 
plaintiff must plead she is a member of a minority group, she applied for the job, she met the 
job qualifications, that she was rejected, and that ''the position remained open and the employer 
continued to seek applicants" with the plaintiff's qualifications. /d. at 802. 
74. 42 U~S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000). 
75. See supra note 27 and accompanying text; see also Longstreetv. Dl. Dep't ofCorr., 276 
F.3d 379, 383-84 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that an employee's transfer to an allegedly more 
diffic~lt .position and negative performance evaluations were not tangible job consequences and 
thus could not qualify as adverse retaliatory action under Title Vll); Weeks v. New York State 
(Div. of Parole), 273 F.3d 76, 87 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that an employee who was transferred 
from one office to another and who was physically removed from her first office failed to state 
a claim for retaliation because the employee failed to "allege what tangible adverse effect this 
incident had on the terms and conditions of her employment"), abrogated on other grounds by 
Nat' I R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan~ 536 U.S. 101 (2002); Sweeney v. West, 149 F.3d 550, 
556-57 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that, although "[a] dirty look or the silent treatment might be as 
effective at discouraging complaints as demoting an employee., the examples used in the 
statute's principle section, namely section 703(a), "exclude instanc~s of different treatment" that 
do not result in some tangible job consequence); Munday v. Waste Mgmt. ofN. Am., 126 F.3d 
239, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding that, for retaliation claims, the adverse action must affect 
''tenns, conditions, or benefits of employment,'' and "instruct[ing] employees to ignore and spy 
on, plaintiff was not an adverse employment action); Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 
1286, 1300-01 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that the adverse employment action required fora prima 
facie case of retaliation ~'incorporates the same ·requirement that ... conduct rise to the level of 
a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) or (2.)" and oral reprimands and derogatory remarks 
"do not rise to the level of[an] adverse employment action"); Randlett v. Shalala, 118 F.3d 857, 
8_62 (1st Cir~ 1997) (stating that even though the retaliation provision is not limited to ''terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment/' the court would incorporate this reference as a 
qualifier of retaliation chums because a broad interpretation would encourage employees who 
were "aggrieved by slights," to file "whimsical claims"); Yerdon v. Henry, 91 F.3d 370,378 (2d 
Cir., 1996) (requiring that, for retaliation claims, adverse employment action must, as in the case 
of disparate treatment claims, affect "'tenns, privileges; duration, or conditions of 
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required that an employee show that she has been subjected to an ultimate 
employment decision. 76 Other courts have mandated that the employee 
demonstrate a "materially adverse" or a "tangible" employment action to 
survive dismissal.77 
•. 
employment'") (quoting Johnson v. Frank, 828 F. Supp. 1143, 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)). 
76. See Hernandez v. Crawford Bldg. Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 531-3.2 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that Matt em's strict ultimate employment decision test mandates a finding that the 
employer's filing of a counterclaim against an employee cannot support a retaliation suit under 
. 
Title Vll); Bennett v. Total MinatomeCorp., 138 F.3d 1053, 1060 n.lO (5th Cir. 1998) (finding 
that allegations that an employer "requir[ ed] [employee] ... to perform manual tasks, plac[ ed] 
him in a smaller office, and reduc[ ed] the number of employees he supervised" is not actionable 
because such conduct does not constitute an ultimate employment decision); Ledergerber v. 
Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir. 1997) (requiring that retaliatory action be an ultimate 
employment decision to be actionable under Title Vll); Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 
F.3d 702, 708 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that "verbal threat of being fired,'' reprimands, and 
"being placed on 'final warning"' were not ultimate employment decisions actionable as 
retaliation). But see Davis v. City of Sioux City, 115 F.3d 1365, 1369 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding 
that employee•s ttansfer to a different, but higher salaried position was actionable where 
employee complained that the new position had "fewer opportunities for salary increases" and 
advancement and was not supervisory); see also Hernandez, 321 F.3d at 533 (Dennis, J., 
concurring) (urging the en bane panel to revisit Mattern, stating that ''this rule is inimical to 
both the text and the purpose of the anti-retaliation provision of Title Vll''); Wideman v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that, based upon the language 
of Title Vn, "the tern1 'discriminate' is not limited to 'ultimate employment decisions,"' and 
unwananted written reprimands, supervisor solicitation of negative statements from other 
employees, threats and needless delay in authorizing medical treatment constitute adverse 
employment actions); Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that 
"demotions, disadvantageous transfers or assignments, refusals to promote, unwarranted 
negative job evaluations and toleration of harassment by other employees" are actionable under 
Title vm; Yartzoffv. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that nonultimate 
employment decisions such as "transfers of job duties and undeserved perfortnance ratings, if 
proven, would constitute 'adverse employment decisions"' under the antiretaliation provision); 
Eric M.D. Zion, Note, Overcoming Adversity: Distinguishing Retaliation from General 
Prohibitions Under Federal Employment Discrimination Law, 761ND. L.J. 191, 194 (2001) 
("[T]he majority of circuits do not restrict section 704(a)' s language to such a reading but 
instead include lesser adverse actions with some minimum level of substantiality."). This 
Article contends, however, that any substantiality test requiring more than proof of a "chilling 
effect" is unwananted by the statutory language. See infra note 100 and accompanying text. 
77. See Petersen v. Utah Dep't ofCorr., 301 F.3d 1182, 1189 (lOth Cir. 2002) (requiring 
that retaliation be a "materially adverse" employment action, and neither allegations of taking 
employee "'out of the information loop'" or unsuccessful atternpt to transfer employee meet this 
standard); Moisant v. Air Midwest, Inc., 291 F.3d 1028, 1031 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that, "to 
establish an adverse employment action [in a retaliation case,] an employee must show a 
'tangible change in duties or working conditions that constitute[] a material employment 
disadvantage"') (quoting Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686,692 (8th Cir. 1997)); 
Gawley v. Ind. Univ .• 276 F.3d 301, 314-15 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiffs claim that 
her supervisor criticized her sexual harassment report and distributed it to unauthorized 
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The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Conunission (EEOC), in its 
Compliance Manual, has correctly interpreted the retaliation provision of Title 
VII to focus on whether the employer's conduct, even if it falls short of a 
termination or tangible act, would deter the reasonable person from engaging 
in protected activity.78 The manual states, "Although trivial annoyances are 
personnel was not a materially adverse employment action and thus could not support a Title 
VII retaliation claim; further, stating that this action falls into "the same-class ... as an 
unfavorable letter [put] in [an] employee's file,'' which may not. result in any material change 
in tenns andconditionsofemployment);Stutlerv.lll. Dep'tofCorr., 263 F.3d698, 702-04(7th 
Cir. 2001) (finding that an employee subjected to an undesired transfer, change in job title, 
negative perfonnance reviews, threats ofterrnination, and other harassing conduct failed to show 
material harm; to be actionable, adverse employment action "must be a 'significant change in 
employment status ... or a decision causing a significant change in benefits"') (quoting Bell 
v. EPA, 232 F~3d 546,555 (7th Cir. 2000)); Hollins v. Atlantic Co., l88 F.3d 652,662 (6th Cir. 
1999) (requiring the "'plaintiff [to] identify a materially adverse change in the terms and 
conditions of his employment to state a claim for retaliation under Title VII',); Boone v. Goldin, 
178 F.3d 253, 256 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that the transfer of an employee to a more stressful 
job is not an adverse employment action because employee failed to show it had a ''significant 
detrimental effect on her"); Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1300 (finding that retaliation must be 
''tangible enough to alter an employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment"); Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 640 (2d Cir. 1997) (requiring that plaintiff show 
"'a materially adverse change in the tenns and conditions of employment"' for an actionable_ 
retaliation claim) (quoting McKenney v. New York City Off-Track Betting Corp~, 903 F. Supp. 
. . . . 
619, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)). 
78. SeeCOMPUANCEMANUAL, supra note6, § 8-II(D)(3), at 8-14. The manual explains: 
The anti-retaliation provisions are exceptionally broad_ They make it unlawful ''to 
discriminate" against an individual because ofhis or her protected activity. This 
is in contrast to the general anti-discrimination provisions which make it unlawful 
to discriminate with respect to an individual's ''enns, conditions, or privileges of 
employment." The retaliation provisions set no qualifiers on the tertn "to 
discriminate/' and therefore prohibit any discrimination that is reasonably likely 
to deter protected activity. -They do not restrict the actions that can be challenged 
to those that affect the tenns and conditions of employment. 
I d. The manual also addresses retaliation claims brought under the ADEA; the EPA, and the 
ADA. ld. § 8. 
The Ninth Circuit, in Ray v. Henderson; adopted the EEOC position; reasoning that 
"[a]lthough EEOC Guidelines are not binding on the courts, they 'constitute a body of 
experience and ilifor1ned judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for 
guidance."' 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 
U.S. 57,65 (1986)); see also Passantino v. Johnson &Johnson ConsumerProds.,Jnc., 212 F.3d 
493, 506 (9th Cir. 2000) (''Title Vll allows employees to freely report actions that they 
reasonably believe are discriminatory, even if those actions are in fact lawful. Absent a judicial 
remedy, the type of actions [that the plaintiff] asserts her employer engaged in could discourage 
other employees from speaking freely about discrimination.") (citation omitted); Hashimoto v. 
Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that ''the retaliatory dissemination of a 
negative employment reference violates Title Vll, even if the negative reference does not affect 
the prospective_ employer's decision not to hire" plaintiffbecause such retaliatory conduct might 
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not actionable, more significant retaliatory treatment that is reasonably likely 
to deter protected activity is unlawful. There is no requirement that the 
adverse action materially affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment."79 Contrary to the approach in many circuits, the manual 
stipulates that actionable retaliation occurs where an employee is reprimanded 
or threatened, where she receives a negative evaluation, or is harassed or 
otherwise adversely treated as the result of her participation in a claim against 
an employer.80 The manual states as obvious examples of adverse action 
"denial of promotion, refusal to hire, denial of job benefits, demotion, 
suspension, and discharge."81 The guidelines also recognize "threats, 
reprimands, negative evaluations, harassment or other adverse treatment" as 
behavior falling within the scope of actionable ad verse employment conduct. 82 
The Cormnission has specifically rejected those decisions that have adopted 
an unduly restrictive construction of the retaliation clause, arguing instead that 
the Act prohibits "any adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive 
and is reasonably likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging in 
protected activity. nSJ 
As some courts have acknowledged, the retaliation provision is broader on 
its face than the general discrimination provision because it reaches all 
retaliatory discrimination. 84 On one level, it may seem incongruous that 
Congress could have intended to prohibit actions under the retaliation clause 
that would be allowed under the discrimination section of the statute. 
However, Congress intentionally refused to adopt a more restrictive retaliation 
have a chilling effect on the remaining employees). 
79. COMPUANCE MANUAL, supra note 6, § 8, at iv. 
80. /d. § 8-II(D)(l), at 8-11. 
81. ld. 
82. ld. 
83. ld. § 8-ll(D)(3), at 8-13. The Commission acknowledges that "petty slights and trivial 
annoyances'' would not likely deter protected activity but that more significant retaliatory 
treatment can be challenged regardless of the level of harm. /d. It has been argued that the 
"reasonably likely to deter'' language is vague; however, courts have had experience for years 
dealing with this standard in the context of First Amendment retaliation claims. See infra notes 
91-95 and accompanying text. 
84. See McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 258 (7th Cir. 1996) (''[P]rovision regarding 
retaliation may intentionally be broader, since it is obvious that effective retaliation against 
employment discrimination need not take the fonn of a job action"); see also Ray v. Henderson, 
217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000) (adopting EEOC standard that "an action is cognizable as 
an adverse employment action if it is reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in 
protected activity"). Older decisions reflect this broader interpretation. See Wyatt v. City of 
Boston, 35 F.3d 13 (lst Cir. 1994), which lists as adverse retaliatory action "demotions, 
disadvantageous transfers or assignments, refusals to promote, unwarranted negative job 
evaluations and toleration of harassment by other employees." /d. at 15-16. 
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provision,85 recognizing that employees are unlikely to come forward.to 
complain of discrimination against them or another employee if they b.elieve 
such action will be met with retaliation in any form. 86 The goals of this 
provision require an assurance that employees who exercise their statutory 
rights or who assist others in doing so will not be subject to adverse action. 
The Supreme Court, in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 87 acknow I edged the ne~d for 
a broad interpretation of Title VII's retaliation provision because those who 
engage in EEOC activity must be confident that the Act will protect them. 88 
The Robinson Court unanimously held that Title Vll protects those ~ho are 
subject to retaliation even after their employment has ended, such as where a 
fonner employer provides a negative reference to a prospective employer. 89 
The Court reasoned that this interpretation of the term "employee" was more 
consistent with the statute and its aims.90 
85. Representative Albert Watson (R ... s.C.) proposed to amend the statute to allow 
employers to retaliate against employees who file charges that are not verified by the EEOC or 
a federal court. 110 CONG. REc. 2729 (1964). The amendment was quickly rejected. ld. at 
2730. In addition, Congress intentionally chose to use the term "discriminate" and the relevant 
legislative history defines this as follows: "to discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a 
difference in treatment or favor." 110 CONG. REc. 7213 (1964), reprinted in U.S. EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF Trn.E Vll AND IX OF CIVIL 
RIG IUS Acr OF 1964, at 3040 ( 1968). The EEOC argues that if Congress wanted the qualifier 
contained in section 703(a) it would have inserted it. See COMPUANCE MANUAL, supra note 6, 
§ 8·ll(D), at 3. 
86. Herrnreiter v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 315 F.3d 742, 746 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting in dictum 
that retaliation claims need not involve a materially adverse employment action because "it 
presumably takes rather little to deter ... alb'Uistic action" by employees who are making or 
assisting a complaint on behalf of a coworker); Glover v. S.C. Law Enforcement Div., 170 F.3d 
411,414 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Section 704(a)'s protections ensure not only that employers cannot 
intimidate their employees into foregoing the Title Vll grievance process, but also that 
investigators will have access to the unchilled testimony of witnesses."); Wideman v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 141 F.Jd 1453, 1456 (11th Cir. 1998) ("Pennitting employers to discriminate 
against an employee who files a charge of discrimination so long as the retaliatory 
discrimination does not constitute an ultimate employment action, could stifle employees' 
willingness to file charges of discrimination."). 
87. 519 u.s. 337 (1997). 
88. /d. at 346. 
89. /d. 
90. ld. Justice Thomas stated that proper statutory analysis requires an examination of the 
actual language, the context in which the language is used, and finally a construction of the 
language within the broader context of the statute. ld. at 341. The tertn "to discriminate" in 
section 704(a) is different from the text in section 703 that requires the discrimination affect the 
tenns and conditions of employment. Compare Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 
§ 704(a), 78 Stat. 241, 257, with§ 703(a), 78 Stat. at 255. Further, Justice Thomas notes that 
a narrow reading of this provision would '\lndermine the effectiveness of Title VII." Robinson, 
519 U.S. at 346. 
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An appropriate analogy is to First Amendment retaliation cases where the 
Supreme Court has suggested that even fairly minor retaliatory harassment 
may be actionable. In Rutan v. Republican Party,91 the Court explained: 
"[T]he First Amendment ... already protects state employees not only from 
patronage dismissals but also from 'even an act of retaliation as trivial as 
failing to hold a birthday party for a public employee . . . when intended to 
punish her for exercising her free speech rights.' "92 The Seventh Circuit had 
proposed that only politically based employment decisions that are "the 
substantial equivalent of a dismissal" violate the First Amendment.93 The 
Supreme Court found this standard unduly restrictive, because it failed to 
recognize that less harsh deprivations can also chill speech.94 
Following Rutan, many courts have recognized that employees alleging free 
speech violations need not show that they were subjected to "materially 
adverse" or "ultimate employment actions," provided the injury "would chill 
a person of ordinary fmnness" from engaging in protected activity.95 
Employees who suffer changes in job responsibilities, reprimands, transfers, 
or threats of discharge in retaliation for engaging in expressive activity have 
91. 497 U.S. 62 (1990) (Rutan II). 
92. Id. at 76 n.8 (quoting Rutan v. Republican Party, 868 F.2d 943,954 n.4 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(Rutan/)) (second alteration in original). Although being denied a birthday party should not 
deter a reasonable employee from going forward with a charge of discrimination, and thus is 
probably not actionable under Title VII, the importance of the Supreme Court's decision is its 
recognition that action short of ultimate, or materially adverse, employment decisions may chill 
speech and thus be actionable. 
93. Rutan I, 868 F.2d at 955-56. 
94. Rutan II, 497 U.S. at 75. 
95. Farmer v. Cleveland Pub. Power, 295 F.3d 593,602 (6th Cir. 2002) (requiring only that 
the plaintiff "suffer an injury that would likely chill a person of ordinary finnness from 
continuing to engage in that [constitutionally protected] activity" to find adverse employment 
action) (quoting Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F. 3d 673, 678 (6th Cir. 1998)) (alteration in original); see 
also Ulrich v. City & County of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 977 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that 
denial of even a trivial benefit may fonn the basis for a First Amendment claim where the aim 
is to punish speech); Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 603-05 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
"unless the claimed retaliatory action is truly 'inconsequential,' the plaintiffs [First 
Amendment] claim should go to the jury, and that the district court erred in ruling that the 
plaintiff had presented insufficient evidence that official's conduct, which consisted of twice 
leaving plaintiffs prison cell in disarray and confiscating legal papers and medical diet snacks, 
had an intimidating effect on him); Smith v. Fruin, 28 F.3d 646, 649 n.3 (7th Cir. 1994) 
("[E]ven minor fonns of retaliation can support a First Amendment clai~ for they may have 
just as much of a chilling effect on speech as more drastic measures."); Bart v. Telford, 677 F.2d 
622, 625 (7th Cir. 1982) ("The effect on freedom of speech may be small, but since there is no 
justification for harassing people for exercising their constitutional rights it need not be great 
in order to be actionable."). In Bart, however, the Court held that trivial actions would be 
actionable only if they fonned part of a "campaign of [retaliatory] harassment." I d. 
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been permitted to litigate their claims.96 Indeed, the Seventh and Ninth 
Circuits have refused to apply the restrictive ''.adverse employment action" 
cases dev,eloped under the federal employment discrimination statutes to First 
Amendment claims.97 Further, courts have recognized that "a combination of 
96. See F armet; 295 F .3d at 602 (finding that a reduction in plaintiffs job responsibilities, 
which plaintiff claimed changed her status from that of a policymaking, supervisor-level 
employee to someone ,engaged in merely performing in clerical and training tasks, qualifies); 
Thomsen v. Romeis, 198F.3d 1022,1027 (7thCir. 2000)(notingthatthreereprimandsmaybe 
• 
actionable if they create the potential for chilling employees' speech on matters of public 
concern, even where the consequences appear somewhat speculative); Edwards v. Goldsboro, 
178 F.3d 231, 246 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that the First Amendment prohibits an employer 
from threatening to discharge an employee in an effort to chill the exercise of the employee's 
First Amendment rights). _ 
97. See Coszalter v. City of Sale~ 320 F.3d 968, 975-76 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that, for 
First Amendment claims, the adverse employment action "need not be severe and it need not 
be of a-certain kind"; although recognizing that the retaliatory action may be so insignificant so 
as not to deter the exercise of First Amendment rights, the coun reJected the use of any 
"exclusive, category-based limitation on the kind of retaliatory action that is actionable under 
the First Amendment"; instead, the court held that it suffices that defendants' action was 
"reasonably likely to deter"employees from engaging in protected activity); Power v. Sununers, 
226 F.3d 815, 820-21 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that, in contrast to federal employment 
discrimination statutes that limit protection to victims of adverse employment action, any 
deprivation that is likely to· deter the exercise of free speech is actionable in First Amendment 
cases). 
Contrary to Power, some courts; in particular those in the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, have 
erroneously required a greater showing of injury even in First Amendment retaliation cases. See 
Serna v. City of San Antonio, 244 F.3d 479, 483-85 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that .adverse 
employment action may occur when employee is transferred, even without accompanying loss 
oftangible job benefits, but "plaintiff must produce enough evidence to allow a reasonable trier 
of fact to conclude that ... the transf~r caused hann to the plaintiff, 'sufficiently serious to 
constitute a constitutional injury"') (quoting Breaux v. City of Garland, 205 F.3d 150,152 (5th 
Cir. 2000)); Breaux, 205 F.3d at 156~61 (holding that ,retaliation consisting of "investigations, 
criticisms, public . • . reprimands, psychological and polygraph testing, suspension with pay, 
[and a] ... transfer do not, either individually or collectively, constitute adverse employment 
actions"). But see Banks v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch~ Bd., 320 F.3d 570, 580 (5th Cir. 
2003) (recognizing that § 1983's definition of adverse employment action is more expansive 
than the ultimate decision test used under Title VII and that a retaliatory act may consist of 
reprimands, disciplinary filings, or a transfer tantamount to a demotion, which would not qualify 
as an ultimate emp'loyment decision under Title Vll; concluding,. however, that failure to 
promote and pay plaintiff at the appropriate· salary would not meet even§ 1983's broadened 
definition of adverse employment action). 
The Eighth Circuit has also improperly cited Title Vll decisions in detertnining that 
retaliatory conduct is not actionable under the First Amendment. See Jones v. Fitzgerald, 285 
F.3d 705, 712-15 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that neither an involuntary transfer, which resulted 
in "no diminution in title, position, salary, job responsibilities, benefits, hours, or other material 
terms or conditions,'" the presence of "negative memoranda in her personnel file," nor an 
internal investigation that resulted in ''no material disadvantage in a terrn or condition of 
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seemingly minor incidents [may] form the basis of a constitutional retaliation 
claim. ''98 Because Congress, in enacting Title Vll' s retaliation provision, was 
similarly concerned with protecting those who seek to disclose employer 
wrongdoing,99 the focus in these cases should be on whether the retaliatory 
treatment would keep a person of ordinary firmness from reporting 
discrimination or assisting another in filing ,a charge. The retaliation provision 
lacks any reference to "tenns and conditions of employment," and thus courts 
should not superimpose the disparate treatment adverse employment action 
requirement onto retaliation cases~ This also means that retaliation need not 
take the form of a job action, but rather, can be separate from the employment 
relationship. 100 Provided it meets the threshold "chilling" or deterrence level, 
. . 
a court should address the magnitude of the retaliatory conduct only at the 
damages phase. 101 Those circuits that have rejected such claims have ignored 
the clear language of the statute and its intended purpose~ 
IV. Proposed Analysis for Employer Wrongdoing 
As suggested in Parts ll and ill, the question of whether an employee has 
suffered sufficient harm to have an actionable claim under Title Vll should 
employment'' constitutes an adverse employment action; to prove a constitutional injury, the 
employee must prove "'a tangible change in duties or working conditions that constitute a 
material disadvantage'") (quoting Phillips v. Collings, 256 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2001)); 
Duffy v. McPhillips, 276 F.3d 988, 992 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that "minor shifts in 
employment responsibility did not significantly alter the conditions of [the plaintiff's] 
employment" and, therefore, did not constitute an adverse employment action); Bechtel v. City 
of Belton, 250 F.3d 1157, 1162 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that "adverse employment action must 
effectuate 'a material change in the tenns or conditions of ... employment'" in order to 
establish a First Amendment violation) (quoting Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 
(8th Cir. 1997)) (alteration in original). But see Meyers v. Neb. Health & Human Servs., 324 
F.3d 655, 659-60 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding that although "[l)oss ofstatus and prestige alone'' will 
not constitute an adverse employment action in a First Amendment retaliation case, district court 
erred in holding that plaintiffs reassignment was not actionable simply because the pay, 
benefits, and job title did not change; where there is evidence that the new position requires 
fewer skills and less responsibility, a jury might find that transfer to a menial position is 
actionable). 
98. Phillips v. Bowen, 278 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 2002) ("[T]o prove a claim of First 
Amendmentretaliation in a situation other than the classic examples of discharge, refusal to hire 
[or] promote, demotion, reduction in pay, and reprimand, plaintiff must show, ( l) using an 
objective standard; (2) the total circumstances_ of her working environment changed to become 
unreasonably inferior and adverse when compared to a typical workplace."). 
99. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. 
100. See infra Part IV.F. 
101. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the severity of 
the retaliatory conduct is relevant to damages, but not liability). 
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depend in part on whether an employee alleges discrimination or retaliation. 102 
Further, the hartn inquiry · should take into account the totality of the 
circumstances and the cumulative effect of various types of discriminatory 
conduct.103 In many fact scenarios, an employee is subjected to various types 
of wrongdoing, including negative evaluations, transfers to a less desirable 
location, and changes in working conditions. 104 With this in mind, the 
following sections will break down each type of employer wrongdoing and 
suggest how courts should analyze an injury in light of the principles 
discussed in Parts ll and ill. 
A. Transfers, Demotions, and Changes in Title 
Many courts have ruled that transfers, demotions, and changes in title that 
are not accompanied by an actual loss of salary or other tangible job benefits 
are not actionable. 105 For example, in Weeks v. New York State (Division of 
Parole),106 the Second Circuit concluded that an employee who was 
transferred from one office to another and was "physically removed" from the 
frrst office could not show an adverse employment action for purposes of her 
retaliation claim because she did not specify what tangible adverse effect this 
transfer had on the terrns and conditions of her employment. 107 Similarly, in 
Stutler v. Illinois Department of Corrections, 108 the court held that an alleged 
retaliatory lateral transfer was not an adverse employment action even if the 
employee did not like his new job because there was no evidence that the 
transfer decreased his benefits or responsibilities. 109 The Fourth Circuit, in 
Boone v. Goldin, 110 determined that the transfer of an employee to a more 
stressful job after settling an administrative complaint could not be an adverse 
employment action where the employee failed to show it had a "significant 
detrimental effect" on her.111 Finally, in Policastro v. Northwest Airlines, 
102. See supra Part II (discussing discrimination) and Part ill (discussing retaliation). 
103. See notes 41 and 61-65 and accompanying text. 
104. See supra note 13. 
105. See cases cited supra note 7. 
106. 273 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. 
v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002). 
107. /d. at 86-87. 
108. 263 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2001). 
109. /d. at 702-04. 
110. 178 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 1999). 
111. /d. at 256; see also White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry ., 310 F.3d 443, 451 (6th Cir. 
2002) (finding that the transfer of a female worker to a job "involv[ing] heavy lifting and more 
physically demanding tasks" after she complained of sexual harassment does not establish a 
prima facie case of retaliation), vacated pending reh 'g en bane, 321 F.3d 1203 (6th Cir. 2003); 
Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that the 
2003] WHAT SHOUW BE ACTIONABLE WRONGDOING? 
. . 
657 
Inc., 112 the Sixth Circuit reasoned that a transfer, which required the employee 
.· 
to travel more often, was not a "materially adverse" change in the terms or 
conditions of employment. 03 The court noted that general reassignments that 
are not accompanied by a change "in salary, benefits, title, or work hours 
usually do not constitute adverse employment actions." 114 While the latter two 
cases involved claims of disparate treatment, the frrst two alleged retaliatory 
motivation. 
As suggested in Part II of this Article, where discrimination takes the fornt 
of unwanted transfers or demotions, even though no tangible job benefits are 
lost, an employee should be permitted to proceed with her disparate treatment 
case without demonstrating a "significant detrimental effect." Although 
employers are obviously perrnitted to assign employees to positions. that are 
more stressful or more physically demanding, where an employee is selected 
for illegitimate discriminatory or retaliatory reasons, a Title VII violation has 
occurred. Unlike sexual harassment, all transfers and demotions are official 
acts of the employer, which trigger the rule of absolute liability. 115 Further, 
such acts must be viewed as explicit, -rather than constructive, alterations of 
the terms or conditions of employment. 116 Provided a reasonable person 
would view the transfer as disadvantageous, the claim should be actionable. 117 
A 1999 EEOC Guidance defines tangible employment action to include any 
"undesirable reassignment."118 Where .a supervisor bas.es a disadvantageous 
reassignment of an employee to more stressful job was not adverse employment action). 
112. 297 F.3d 535 (6th Cir. 2002). 
113. ld. at 539-40. 
114. ld. at 539 .. 
115. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text. See also the Court's explanation in 
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998): 
When a supervisor makes a tangible employment decision, there is assurance 
the injury could not have been inflicted absent the agency relation .. , . A co~ 
worker can break a co-worker's ann as easily as a supervisor, and anyone who has 
regular contact with an employee can inflict psychological injuries by his or her 
offensive conduct. But one co-worker (absent some elaborate scheme) cannot 
dock another's pay, nor can one co-worker demote another. 
/d. at 761·62 (citations omitted). 
116. In Ellerth, the Court distinguished explicit discriminatory changes to the tenns or 
conditions of employment from constructive alterations, where the conduct must be severe or 
pervasive in order to be actionable. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752. 
117. All the circuits that have addressed this issue have agreed that an adverse employment 
action must be viewed objectively: "H a transfer is truly lateral and involves. no significant 
changes in an employee's conditions of employment, the fact that the employee views the 
transfer either positively or negatively does not of itself render the denial or receipt of the 
tnnsfer adverse employment action~'·' Sanchez v. Denver Pub. Sch., 164 F.3d 527, 532 n.6 
(lOth Cir" 1998). See also cases cited supra note 47. 
118. EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 48, §IV (B). 
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employment decision on an illicit criterion, courts should impose absolute 
vicarious liability on the employer. 119 
The Supreme Court in its sexual harassment cases has ratcheted up the 
standard for absolute vicarious liability, requiring "reassignment with 
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant 
change in benefits.''120 However, an ,employee's failure to meet the higher 
standard does not alter the vicarious liability rule. It simply means that an 
employer would be pertnitted to assert, as an affmnative defense, that it took 
reasonable steps to prevent and correct a supervisor's harassing conduct, and 
that the employee unreasonably failed to avail herself of the employer's 
grievance mechanism. 121 The U.S. Supreme Court's goal was to encourage 
employers to adopt and enforce effective sexual harassment policies in the 
workplace, and perhaps to provide some leeway to employers in this still 
evolving area of the Iaw.122 
In the typical disparate treatment case challenging a transferor demotion, 
this should not be a concern.- Since 1964, employers have been well aware 
that race- or gender-based transfers or demotions violate Title Vll. 'Further, 
even if an affrrmative defense is available, these are cases where employees 
act "reasonably" in coming forward to challenge discriminatory practices. 123 
Thus, traditional agency principles, which impose liability on the employer for 
119. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
120. Ellenh, 524 U.S. at 761; see also supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
121. Ellenh, 524 U.S. at 742; see also Miller v. Kenworth ofDothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 
1279-80 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding that the employer has no affirmative defense where, despite 
having a policy, "no member of the managemenfhierarchy was familiar with it, [and] it was not 
posted in the workplace"; further, an antiharassment policy will be "found ineffective when 
company practice indicates a tolerance towards harassment or discrimination!'); Haugerud v. 
Amery Sch. Dist., 259 F.3d 678,699 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding that, although the school district 
had a sexual harassment policy with a complaint procedure, it failed to exercise reasonable care 
in preventing harassing conduct where, following a female custodian's complaint, the school 
district did not pursue an internal investigation or take any effective remedial action); Nichols 
v. Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 877 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that, although an employer 
satisfied the frrst prong of the affirmative defense by requiring mandatory sexual harassment 
training for all of its employees and adopting a written antiharassment policy clearly setting 
forth reporting procedures, it failed to exercise reasonable care to promptly correct sexually 
harassing behavior where human resources director conducted only a handful of spot checks but 
made no effort to investigate complaint or to discuss allegations with perpetrators); Greene v~ 
Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 674~75 (D.C. Cir.l999) (holding that, in order to meet its affirmative 
defense, an employer must establish not only that the victim of harassment inexcusably delayed 
reporting the harassment, but also that a reasonable person would have come forward early 
enough to prevent the harassment from becoming severe or pervasive). 
122. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764. 
123. See-infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text. 
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its agent's misconduct, should govern. 124 Where race, gender, religion, or 
national origin is a motivating factor behind a disfavored change in an 
employee's job, a court should find liability. The extent of the harm caused 
by the transfer or demotion should be assessed only at the damages phase. 
In the context of a retaliation claim, which does not even require a change 
in the terms and conditions of employment,. the only inquiry is whether the 
retaliatory action would have deterred a reasonable employee from exercising 
her statutory right to bring a claim or to assist another in bringing a claim. 125 
Most workers would probably be unwilling to subject themselves to transfers 
that add mileage onto their trips or that create the stress of new job 
responsibilities~ .or to demotions, which can clearly cause emotional distress 
and embarrassment even when not acc_ompanied by a "tangible" job loss. 126 
The courts' failure to recognize the emotional injury caused by 
discriminatory or retaliatory transfers, demotions; or changes in job title is 
directly contrary to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which has the very purpose 
to ensure that emotional harms imposed as a result of imperntissible bias 
would be appropriately recognized and rectified by an award of da•nages_.127 
Arguably, if a transfer is more or at least equally desirable, an employee will 
have difficulty establishing chilling effect or imperrnissible intent, and thus 
employers should not fear frivolous litigation. 128 On the other hand, courts are 
ignoring the fact that "where a person lives and works often is more important 
124. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (finding that Congress 
intended courts "to look to agency principles for guidance" when determining employer liability 
under Title Vll). 
125. See supra Part III (discussing retaliation). 
126. See, for example, Dilenno v. Goodwill Industries of Mid-Eastern Pennsylvania, 162 
F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 1998), which held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment 
where an employee alleged that she was transferred to a job that her employer knew she could 
not perfonn. ld. at 236. The court also stated that "[i]t is important to take a plaintiffs job-
related attributes into account when detenuining whether a lateral transfer was an adverse 
employment action." /d. The point is that only a careful sifting of the facts will deterrnine 
whether a transfer is uadverse,'' even where economic factors and title remain the same. 
127. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
128. Contra Cude &, Steger, supra note 18, at 398 ("[A] liberal interpretation~ .. opens the 
door to a myriad of claims for trivial acts, and gives the courts free reign to second-guess an 
employer's business decisions.,.). The authors also express their concern that courts will 
become "bogged down in trivial disputes within the workplace." ld. But see Zion~ supra note 
76, at 215 (arguing that the trend towards narrow definition of section 704(a) has not led to less 
litigation; rather, the empirical data demonstrates an increase in retaliation claims filed with the 
EEOC). Further, a plaintiff must still demonstrate that the action is sufficiently harsh to deter 
the reasonable employee, that there is a causal connection between the_ adverse action and the 
protected activity, and that any purported legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext for 
retaliation. See, e.g., EEOC v. Avery Dennison Corp., 104 F.3d 858, 860 (6th Cir. 1997). 
• 
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than the salary or benefits he/she receives,"129 and thus an employee should be 
given the opportunity to prove that a transfer decision is objectively, as well 
as subjectively, adverse. 
B. Negative Evaluations. Reprimands, and Threats of Termination or 
Demotion · 
Many courts have dismissed employee claims where the employer's 
wrongdoing consists of alleged unmerited negative evaluations, reprimands; 
or threats of termination or demotion. The rationale given is that until the 
negative evaluations or threats culminate in the loss of tangible job benefits, 
an employee has no recourse under Title Vll.130 Thus, in Ribano v. United 
Airlines, Inc.,131 the court noted that unfavorable letters placed in an 
employee's file are not actionable retaliation because they may not result in 
a material change in the terms and conditions of employment. 132 In Smart v. 
Ball State University, 133 the court stated that the question was "not whether 
[the plaintiff's] perforn1ance evaluations were undeservedly negative, but 
whether even undeserved poor evaluations can alone constitute" an adverse 
employment action sufficient to state a prima facie case.134 The court rejected 
the plaintiff's claim, asserting that "not everything that makes an employee 
unhappy is an actionable adverse action."135 In Weston v. Pennsylvania, 136 the 
court similarly ruled that two written reprimands placed in an officer's 
personnel file after he complained about sexual harassment could -not 
constitute an adverse employment action where the officer "was not demoted 
in title, did not have his work schedule changed, was not reassigned to a 
different position or location in the prison ... and that he was not denied any 
pay raise or promotion as a result of these reprimands."137 
129. Lepique v. Hove, 217 F.3d 1012, 1014 (8th Cir. 2000) (Heaney, J., concurring). Note 
that the judge concurred in the decision that a transfer is not actionable if it does not result in 
a change in the employee's pay, benefits, or working conditions because he felt bound by the 
circuit's precedent. /d. (Heaney, J., concurring). 
130. See cases cited supra note 8. 
131. 200 F. 3d 507 (7th Cir. 1999). 
132. /d. at 511. 
133. 89 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 1996)~ 
134. Id. at 442. 
135., /d. at 441. 
136. 251 F.3d 420 (3d Cir. 2001 ). 
137. Id. at 431; see also Robinson v. City ofPittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1301 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(findingthat"allegationsthat [plaintiff] was subjected to 'unsubstantiated oral reprimands' and 
'unnecessary derogatory comments' following her compJa'int do not rise to the level of [an] 
'adverse employment action'"). 
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In rejecting these claims, many courts have mistakenly required proof of a 
tangible or materially adverse employment action. In Longstreet v. Illinois 
Department of Corrections, 138 the court threw out an employee's challenge to 
an alleged retaliatory negative performance evaluation on the grounds that it 
did not create "tangible job consequences."139 In Rabinovitz v. Pena, 140 the 
lowered perforrnance rating actually cost the employee a $600 bonus, and yet 
the court reasoned that "loss of a bonus is not an adverse employment action 
... where the employee is not automatically entitled to the bonus."141 In 
Weeks v. New York State (Division of Parole), a female employee who 
received notice of a disciplinary action and a "counseling memo" was held not 
to have stated a prima facie case of gender discrimination despite evidence 
that male officers did not receive similar notices or memos under similar 
circumstances. 142 The court reasoned that the plaintiff failed to show what the 
specific ramifications of the notice or memo would be and how this created 
a "materially adverse" change in working conditions.143 Similarly, in Davis 
v. Town of Lake Park, Florida, 144 the court reasoned that a negative job 
performance memorandum, whic~ in fact warned that continued misconduct 
would result in departmental action, did not amount to an adverse employment 
action, even though the negative review remained in the officer's personnel 
file, because the officer could not demonstrate that he lost any pay or benefits, 
nor was there evidence of a foreseeable future economic injury. 145 
Such negative reports; reprimands, and threats of termination inherently 
cause an alteration in the terms and conditions of employment and, where the 
adverse action is motivated by impermissible discrimination, Title Vll 
mandates that courts hold employers liable. These decisions ignore the 
emotional harrn suffered by an employee who receives unwarranted criticism, 
an undeserved negative perforn1ance evaluation, or who is forced to work 
under the threat of tennination. Working in a stressful environment is no 
different than working in a sexually harassing environment, which the U.S. 
138. 276 F.3d 379 (7th Cir. 2002). 
139. /d. at 384. 
140. 89 F.3d 482 (7th Cir~ 1996). 
141. /d. at488-89. But see Russell v. Bd. ofTrs., 243 F.3d 336, 340-41,345 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that the district court erroneously ruled that a five ... day, unpaid suspension was not 
"materially adverse" where the suspension was accompanied by entry on fonnerly spotless 
record that employee bad committed theft of services by falsifying time records). 
142. Weeks v. New York State (Div. of Parole), 273 F.3d 76, 86-87 (2d Cir. 2001). 
143. /d.; see also LaCroix v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 240 F.3d 688, 692 (8th Cir. 2001) ("[A] 
negative review is actionable only where the employer subsequently uses the evaluation as a 
basis to detrimentally alter the terms or conditions of the recipient's employment."). 
144. 245 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2001). 
145. /d. at 123746. 
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Supreme Court has recognized as an alteration in the terms and conditions of 
employment. 146 As in the case of transfers or demotions, only agents of the 
employer are given authority to evaluate work perfortnance. If an employee 
can establish that the motivation for this type of adverse employment action 
is race, gender, religion, or national origin, an employee should have recourse 
against the employer under Title VII. 
On the other hand, if the case involves only harassing threats of demotion 
or tennination, then a question is raised as to whether an affmnative defense 
should be available. Indeed, Ellerth itself was a case involving unfulfilled 
threats of adverse employment action. 147 In Ellerth, the Court held that if an 
employer has in place a mechanism for challenging threats of terrnination and 
the employee unreasonably fails to avail herself of that opportunity, then the 
affirmative defense has been met and the employer will not be held liable for 
the supervisor's action. 148 However, the employer bears the burden of 
demonstrating that it took appropriate measures both to prevent and promptly 
correct the supervisor's misconduct and that the employee acted 
unreasonably. 149 Where an employer meets the first part of the test, but the 
employee promptly reports the wrongdoing and thus mitigates the damages, 
the employer is still liable for the intervening injury. 150 
Employers can best protect themselves by training their agents that 
discrimination will not be tolerated and that such conduct will jeopardize their 
jobs. Further, they can prevent, or at least significantly mitigate, any damages 
by having in place an effective mechanism for challenging unwarranted, 
discriminatory threats and promptly investigating and correcting any illegal 
misconduct. Under this analysis, the law requires the employer to 
146. Meritor Sav. B~ FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,67 (1986). 
147. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 748 (1998). 
148. /d. at 765. 
149. See Johnson v. West, 218 F.3d 725, 731 (7th Cir. 2000) (requiring that a defendant 
meet both prongs of the affinnative defense). But see David Sherwyn et al., Don't Train Your 
Employees and Cancel Your "1-800, Harassment Hotline: An Empirical Euzmination and 
Correction of the Flaws in the Affirmative Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 
FORDHAM L. REv. 1265, 1288 (2001), which cites statistics indicating that employers prevail 
regardless of whether plaintiffs exercised reasonable care. Further, employers prevailed on 
summary judgment in a majority of cases in which they invoked the · ve defense. /d. at 
1287-88. 
150. In Ellerth, the Court stated thatEllerth's claim involved "numerous alleged threats'' of 
terrnination but it ~'express[ ed] no opinion as to whether a single unfulfilled threat is sufficient 
to constitute discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 
754. The fact that the claim involved only unfulfilled threats did not preclude a finding that the 
employee was subjected to different tenns and conditions of employment. ld. at 754. However, 
because Ellerth had not suffered a tangible employment action, the case was remanded to allow 
Burlington to prove the two elements of the affinnative defense. ld. at 766. 
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acknowledge the wron,gdoing, rather than sweeping it under the rug by simply 
asserting "no harm, no foul.·" 
In the context of retaliation claims, employees who know that they may 
receive reprimands, negative evaluatiol)s, or threats of termination, may be 
deterred from going forward with claims of discrimination or assisting others 
in doing so., As to both disparate treatment and retaliation claims, questions 
such as the degree of the ·negative evaluation, that is, how significant is a 
. . 
change from "highly successful'' to "successful," or whether the evaluation 
becomes part of the employee's permanent file, should help determine the 
amount of emotional distress an employee would reasonably suffer under the 
circumstances. 151 Thus, these issues affect damages, not liability. 152 
C. Temporary Suspensions, Demotions, and Other Adverse Action 
Several courts have ruled that temporary suspensions or reprimands that the 
employer ultimately rectifies are not actionable. In Weston v. Pennsylvania; 
the court held that employer's placement of two written reprimands in an 
employee's personnel file subsequent to the employee's complaint about 
. . . 
sexual harassment did not constitute an adverse employment action because 
the reprimands were of a temporary nature and would not be pennanently 
affixed to the plaintiff's employment file. 1s3 In Stewart v. Evans,154 the court 
held that an attempt to obstruct a federal employee's award nomination was 
not an adverse employment action because the employee eventually received 
the award.155 More broadly, the court stated that mere delay in obtaining a 
position should not be viewed as an alteration of the terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment contemplated by Title VIT. 156 In Dobbs-Weinstein 
151. For example, in Spears v. Missouri Department of Corrections & Human Resources, 
.210 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 2000), the court held that a perfortnance evaluation that declined from 
''highly successful" to "successful" was not an adverse employment action because there was 
''no evidence that the Department subsequently used the evaluation to [the plaintiffs] 
detriment." /d. at 853-54. However, the plaintiff contended that the evaluation caused her 
emotional distress because it '"demeaned her in the eyes of coworkers.,'" I d. at 853-54. 
152. Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F. 3d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that the government's 
argument that an alleged retaliatory, negative job reference from a fonner employer is not 
actionable because the prospective employer would not have hired plaintiff regardless of the 
negative job reference ''fail[ ed] to recognize the distinction between a violation and the 
availability of remedies .... [D]issemination of the adverse job reference violated Title VU 
because it was a 'personnel action' motivated by retaliatory animus. That this unlawful 
personnel action turned out to be inconsequential goes :to the issue of damages, not liability . ")., 
153. Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d420, 431 (3d Cir~ 2001) .. 
154. 275 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
155. /d. at 1135. 
156. ld. at 1135-36. 
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v. Vanderbilt University ,151 the court held that a dean's discriminatory decision 
to oppose a departmental tenure recommendation did not constitute an adverse 
employment action where the faculty member had recourse to an. internal 
grievance process and was given tenure from the date she originally should 
• 
have received it absent the dean's misconduct.158 Although. the plaintiff 
• 
received no pay for three months, the court nonetheless fouf!d that the 
• 
reinstatement with back pay and benefits kept the original discriminatory 
decision from being an adverse empioyment decision. 159 It reasoned that 
interlocutory decisions, even if they cause emotional distress, are not 
actionable under Title VII provided they do not affect the ultimate outcome. 160 
These decisions ignore the 1991 Amendment to Title VII, which created a 
• 
damage remedy in order to compensate plaintiffs for the emotional harm 
caused ·by discriminatory or retaliatory action, even in the absence of 
• 
economic loss. 161 Further, in cases where suspensions are without pay but the 
employee eventually appeals and is reimbursed~ a finding that the employee 
has suffered no adverse action demonstrates a cruel indifference to the reality 
,• 
that some workers "may be living from paycheck to paycheck," and thus,_the 
stress and emotional injury is far from trivial or de minimis. 162 
Contrary to these decisions, the Seventh Circuit, in Molnar v. Booth,163 
recognized that allowing a supervisor to demote an employee with impunity, 
as long as the decision is later reversed and the employee is returned or 
restored to her forrner position, ignores the intervening harm and sends the · 
• 
157. 185 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 1999). 
158. /d. at 545. 
159. ld. 
160. ld. at 545-46; see also White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., 310 F.3d 443,453-54 
(6th Cir. 2002) (holding that a thirty-seven-day suspension without pay right before Chrisbrats 
was not an adverse employment action where the employee appealed the decision and was 
reinstated with backpay, because "[w]hile emotional injuries may be affected by the season, it 
does not make the suspension a sufficiently adverse employment action"), vacated pending 
reh~g ,en bane, 321 F.3d 1203 (6th Cir. 2003); Mungin v. Katten Muchin &. Zavis, 116 F.3d 
1549, 1555 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing decisions from the Fourth and Fifth Circuits holding that 
'"interlocutory or mediate decisions having no immediate effect upon employment ... were not 
intended to fall within the direct proscriptions of ... Title Vll"') (quoting Page v. Bolger, 645 
F.2d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1981) (alterations in original). 
161. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. 
162. See White, 310 F.3dat45'8-59 (Clay, J., dissenting) ("Suddenly, Plaintiffhad no income 
with which to pay her bills, and was left in limbo to await a detet·rnination as to her future at the 
railroad"). The dissent in White argued that reimbursement affects damages, but should "not 
[be] dispositive of whether an adverse employment action has occurred."Jd. at 459. Note that 
judgment has been vacated pending en bane review. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., 
321 F.3d 1203 (6th Cir. 2003). 
163. 229 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 2000). 
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message to supervisors that they can harass employees without 
consequence. 164 Thus, even though a school principal's negative evaluation, 
which could have· 'ended the plaintiff's teaching career, was reversed six 
months later by the local school board, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the 
teacher was entitled to recover damages for the emotional injury she suffered 
in the intervening six ;months as she tried to get the decision reversed. 165 
Clearly, in the context of retaliation claims, employees might b.e deterred 
from exercising their statutory rights if they knew that going forward could 
result in temporary suspensions or demotions. The knowledge that one's 
rights may eventually be vindicated and a position restored or a name cleared 
provides little solace to the employee who wishes to avoid the stress and 
turmoil such temporary adverse action can cause. If the employer acts 
promptly to correct the wrongdoing, it can limit damages, but courts should 
not ignore the fact that a Title VII violation has occurred, and an employee has 
been injured. 
The notion that "interlocutory" decisions are not actionable absent some 
tangible or ultimate decision is contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in 
Roblnson v. Shell Oil Co. 166 In Robinson, an ex-employee's only complaint 
was that his former employer provided a negative reference regarding his job 
perforinance. 167 By definition this cannot constitute an ultimate employment 
action because the former employer has no authority to make a binding 
. 
employment decision regarding a nonemployee. However, the holding in 
Robinson was not conditioned on the prospective employer making an 
ultimate employment decision not to hire it was the wrongdoing of the 
former employer, even though it consisted only of a negative reference, which 
the Court considered actionable. 168 If the prospective employer in fact hires 
the plaintiff, dantages in any significant atnount will be difficult to prove. 169 
164. /d. at 600-01. 
165. /d.; see also Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 295 F.3d 335, 351 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding that 
an employee should be able to recover where pay is temporarily suspended, even though back 
wages are eventually paid, because loss of an unexpected steady income can have a serious 
impact on an employee). 
166. See supra notes 87 .. 90 and accompanying text. 
167. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 339 (1997). 
168. Id. at 339-40, 345-46. 
169. Note that an EEOC Enforcement Guidance states that compensatory damages require 
some manifestation of emotional hann: "The existence, nature, and severity of emotional hann 
must be proved." U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, NO. 915.002, 
ENR.>RCEMENTGUIDANCE: COMPENSATORY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES AVAilABLE UNDER§ 102 
OF THE CIVIL RIGJUS Acr OF 1991 § II(A)(2) ( 1992), available at http://www .eeoc.gov/policy/ 
docs/damages.html A bruised ego caused by a negative reference that did not influence any 
hiring_ decision is unlikely to trigger a large award. 
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The key point, however, is that mediate decisions trigger Title Vll liability, 
and a court should discuss the issues regarding extent of the injury at the 
damages phase, not the liability phase. 
D. Changes in Working Conditions: Schedules, Wo~kload, and Support 
Several courts have ruled that employees who have been subjected to 
different work schedules, given additional work assigmt1ents, or denied 
secretarial or other support services have not suffered an adverse employment 
action, either in the context of a disparate treatment or a retaliation case. For 
example, in Markel v. Board of Regents, 170 an employee claimed that she was 
denied better equipment and resources to travel, and that the employer had 
taken certain accounts from her, which caused her to miss bonuses. 171 The 
court rejected her claims, reasoning that the loss of support services, standing 
alone, is not actionable retaliation. 172 Similarly, in Jacob-Mua v. Veneman, 173 
the court denied the retaliation complaint of an employee who alleged that 
"she was given work assignments not commensurate with her skills, abilities, 
and job functions, given inferior equipment by her supervisors ... and denied 
timely promotion."174 In rejecting this claim, the court focused on the fact 
that, overall, the employee's salary increased during the course of her 
employment, and she was eventually given pennission to hire an intern to 
assist her in performing the additional work duties.175 Other courts have held 
that denial of secretarial support, 176 alteration of work schedules, 177 or the 
• 
170. 276 F.3d 906 (7th Cir. 2002). 
171. ld. at 911. 
172. ld. at 911-12. Compare the Seventh Circuit's 1996 decision in Knox v. Indiana, 93 
F.3d 1327 (7tbCir. 1996), wherethecourtstated thatdeprivingapersonofpreviously available 
support services, such as secretarial help or a desktop computer, constitutes an adverse 
employment action. /d. at 1334. 
173. 289 F.3d 517 (8th Cir. 2002). 
174. ld. at 522. 
175. ld. 
176. Gorence v. Eagle Food Ctts., Inc., 242 F.3d 759,766 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that loss 
of secretarial support, even when accompanied by a title change, does not constitute adverse 
employment action where such does not involve the loss of pay or benefits). 
177. Grube v. Lau Indus., 257 F.3d 723,729 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding that the plaintiff, who 
was assigned to the night shift after working day shift for twenty years, failed to state an adverse 
employment action, because •'Title VII simply was never intended to be used as a vehicle for 
an employee to complain about the hours she is scheduled to work or the effect those hours have 
upon the time an employee spends with family members"); Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 
511-12 (Sth Cir. 1999) (finding that an employee whose work schedule was changed after she 
filed a complaint about her supervisor could not allege retaliation where the change in schedule 
did not affect her salary); Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1465 (9th Cir. 
1994) (stating that a transfer to another shift was not an adverse employment action). 
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assignment of menial or degrading tasks 178 are not actionable. Contrary to the 
text and spirit of Title Vll, these decisions ignore both the employer's 
wrong_doing as well as the emotional injury that the victim of discrimination 
suffers. 
Almost by definition, when an employer changes. an employee's working 
conditions for discriminatory or retaliatory reasons, an employee has been 
wrongfully subjected to different terms and conditions of employment 
Characterizing such changes as de minimis or a minor inconvenience, 
particularly at the sunuttary judgment stage, denies the employee the 
opportunity to prove how these changes have affected her ability to perform 
her job. The U.S. Supreme Court, in its sexual harassment cases, recognized 
that interference with work perforrnance, and an employer's attempts to do so, 
is a core concern of Title Vll. 179 Following the Supreme Court's. guidance, 
several lower courts have recognized sexual harassment claims where an 
employee asserted unreasonable interference with work performance. 180 
178. See, e.g .. , Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1086 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding 
that an assignment to window-washing task in retaliation for employee's complaint about 
supervisor'·s alleged sexual harassment was nothing more than '"mere inconvenience or an 
alteration of job responsibilities"' and cannot be characterized as an adverse employment action, 
despite employee's assertion that this assignment was "degrading and punitive") (quoting Crady 
v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & ·Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993));_ Bennett v. Total 
Minatome Corp., 138 F.3d 1053, 1060 n.lO (5th Cir. 1998) (noting that allegations that 
employer required ellq)loyee "to perform manual tasks, plac[ed] him in a smaller officet and 
reduc[ ed] the number of employees he supervised" is not actionable because this conduct "does 
not constitute an 'ultimate employment decision'"). 
179. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. 
180. LaDay v. Catalyst Tech., Inc., 302 F.3d 474, 482-83 (5th Cir. 2002) (allowing the 
plaintiff to survive summary judgment by alleging that supervisor's conduct in making 
. . . . 
obnoxious comments about his sexuality, and in physically touching employee's anus on one. 
occasion caused him physical and psychological difficulties that impaired his ability to work); 
Greene v. Adm'rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 284 F.3d 642, 656 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that a 
rational jury could determine that the harasser's. "conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive 
to create a hostile work environment" where actions "interfered with [employee's] work 
perfortnance" and caused her to suffer ·"severe psychological effects"); Holtz v. Rockefeller & 
Co., 258 F.3d62, 75-76 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that.thedistrictcourterredingranting summary 
judgment where plaintiffalleged that supervisor '''grabbed' and 'placed his hand on [her] hand' 
on a 'daily' basis," making it almost impossible for plaintiff to perforrn her work) (alteration in 
original); O'Rourke v. City of Providence~ 235 F.3d 713, 729-30 (1st Cir. 2001) (finding that 
harassing conduct; which consists of work-sabotaging pranks that "undermines her ability to 
succeed at her job, those acts should be considered along with overtly sexually abusive conduct 
in assessing a hostile work environment claim,;); Hathaway v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1214, 1223 
(8th Cir. 1997) (finding it sufficient that the plaintiff "credibly testified that she felt afraid, 
intimidated, and anxious, and that those feelings had a detrimental impact on her psychological 
well-being and on her ability to perfonn her work .... That she was still able-to complete her 
assigned tasks does not undennine the jury's finding that a reasonable person subjected to this 
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Where there is evidence that other, similarly situated employees are not 
subject to these disfavored conditions, courts should not tolerate these forms 
of discriminatory action. Indeed, in characterizing the types of tangible 
employment actions that trigger absolute vicarious liability in the context of 
sexual harassment claims, the Ellerth-F aragher Court included discriminatory 
"work assigmnents."181 The goal of Title VII was to create equal employment 
opportunity in the workplace. When an employer bases his decision regarding 
work shifts, support staff, and job assigtunents on a person's gender, race, or 
national origin, that employer has violated the letter and spirit of the 
antidiscrimination law. 
In the case of retaliation, the sole question is whether a reasonable 
employee would feel deterred from bringing an action or supporting another 
in pursuing claims under Title Vll because of the employer's conduct. 182 If 
the change in working conditions is truly minor, such that it would not 
dissuade a reasonable employee from coming forward, that would provide a 
basis for dismissing a case at the sununary judgment stage. In the cases 
discussed above, however, it can reasonably be argued that being assigned 
menial or degrading tasks, being denied secretarial support, having one's 
hours changed, or being assigned extra work would chill most employees from 
coming forward, either on their own behalf or on behalf of others. 183 
E. Company Tolerated Harassment by Coworkers and Supervisors 
The question of when harassment should be actionable is a little more 
complex. Initially, if the harassment takes the forrns mentioned above, i.e., 
transfers, negative evaluations, or changes in working conditions, the analysis 
set forth in earlier sections should apply. On the other hand, where the 
harassment consists solely of humiliating or harassing verbal or physical 
conduct 'would find ... harassment so altered working conditions as to make it more difficult 
to do the job.") (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring)). 
181. "[T]here is nothing remarkable in the fact that claims against employers for 
discriminatory employment actions with tangible results, like hiring, firing, promotion, 
compensation, and work assignment, have resulted in employer liability once the discrimination 
was shown." Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 790 (1998). 
182. See supra Part ill; see also Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1244 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that the elimination of a program, change in employee's start time, and changes in 
standard procedures constituted adverse retaliatory action). 
183. See also Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 162 F.3d 778,787-88 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(finding that a litigant suing under the ADA's antiretaliation provision could pursue a claim that 
his work schedule was changed in retaliation for his having engaged in EEOC activity, because 
"[n]othing in the ADA suggests that employers are prohibited from taking only those retaliatory 
actions that impose an 'extreme hardship'"). 
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abuse, the Supreme Court decisions regarding sexual harassment, which are 
interpreting the same disparate treatment language, should govern.. As 
previously discussed, the Supreme Court has ruled that an employee who is 
forced to work in a harassing environment, whether by coworkers or by an 
employer, may have an actionable Title VII claim because that person has 
been subjected to different terms and conditions of employment. 184 However, 
the Supreme Court has also made it clear that Title VII does not impose a code 
of civility in the workplace, and that such claims must be sufficiently severe 
or pervasive so as to truly alter the tertns and conditions of employment. In 
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 185 the Court cautioned that Title 
Vll' s prohibition does not require uasexuality nor androgyny in the workplace; 
it forbids only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the 'conditions' of 
the victim's employment." 186 Although the case arose in the context of same-
sex harassment, where establishing gender as a motivating factor is more 
difficult, Justice Scalia made a broader statement, warning courts and juries 
"to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing ... and conduct which 
a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position would find severely hostile or 
abusive."187 Similarly, in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,188 the_ Court 
mandated that a meritorious claim of hostile work environment required the 
conduct be so "extreme [as] to amount to a change in the terms and conditions 
of employment."189 Arguably this same high bar will apply whenever the 
adverse employment action consists of harassment, whether motivated by 
gender, race, religion, or national origin. 
What is problematic, however; is the extension of the "severe or pervasive" 
requirement to retaliation cases where courts are not interpreting the terms and 
conditions language, but should simply be asking whether the conduct is such 
as would chill the reasonable employee from asserting claims under Title Vll. 
The EEOC Compliance Manual explains that where an employee is kept 
"under surveillance" for filing a Title VII charge, actionable retaliation has 
occurred. Similarly, where a supervisor regularly invites all employees to 
lunch, but excludes the complaining party, ''this would constitute unlawful 
retaliation since it could reasonably deter [the complaining party] or others 
from engaging in protected activity.''190 It appears that almost all of the circuit 
184. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text. 
185. 523 u.s. 75 (1998). 
186. ld. at 81. 
187. /d. at 82. 
188. 524 u.s. 775 (1998). 
189. /d. at 788. 
190., COMPUANCE MANUAL, supra note 6, § 8-ll(D)(3), at 8-14. The EEOC cites Robinson 
v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997), to support its interpretation: it "accords with the primary 
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courts that have addressed the issue have concluded that mere harassing 
behavior is not actionable retaliation unless the harassing conduct itself is so 
severe as to be actionable harassment under the disparate treatment 
standard. 191 One court has held that "[c]onditions of employment designed to 
harass· and humiliate an employee because she is a member of [a] protected 
class[] may constitute an adverse employment action" only if the harassment 
is "severe or pervasive." 192 
It should be clear that harassment may deter employees from exercising 
their statutory rights even if it is not "severe" or ~'pervasive." If the 
harassment is truly minor, a court should not find it sufficient to chill speech. 
However, a rigid application of a "severity" or "pervasive" rule confounds the 
discriminatory treatment provision of Title VII, where courts must interpret 
what is a change in tenns and conditions of employment, with the 
antiretaliation provision, which flatly bars all retaliatory discrimination. 
Nonetheless, many courts have found that if the harassment does not 
"materially" alter tenns and conditions of employment, it cannot provide a 
basis for a retaliation claim. Thus, courts have not permitted employees who 
are subjected to threats and harassing phone calls, 193 or who are ostracized by 
the supervisor and coworkers,194 or whose work is monitored more closely195 
purpose of the anti-retaliation provisions, which is to '[m]aintain[] unfettered access to statutory 
remedial mechanisms.'" I d. § 8-ll(D), at 8-15. 
191. E.g., Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't ofCorr~ Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 446 (2d Cir. 1999); 
Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coli., 152 F.3d 1253, 1262-64 (lOth Cir. 1998); Wideman v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th Cir. 1998); Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 
15-16 (1st Cir. 1994). 
192. Hilt-Dyson v. City of Chicago, 282 F.3d 456, 466 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 531 
U.S. 820 (2002). Note that the certiorari petition specifically raised the question of whether a 
retaliation claim under Title VII "require[s] [the] same 'adverse employment action' needed to 
establish discrimination with respect to" terms and conditions of employment. Hilt Dyson v. 
City of Chicago, 70 U.S.L.W. 3762 (U.S. June 11, 2002) (No. 01-1758). Unfortunately, the 
Supreme Court failed to resolve this statutory conundrum. 
193. Rizzo v. Sheahan, 266 F.3d 705, 717·18 (7th Cir. 2001). 
194. Gagnon v. Sprint Corp., 284 F.3d 839, 850 (8th Cir. 2002) (declaring that "[i]t is well-
settled in this circuit that ostracism and rudeness by supervisors and co-workers do[es] not rise 
to the level of an adverse employment action" and, although employee alleged he was ignored 
by supervisor, and "it became difficult for him to function as a member of [the] team, [there 
was] no evidence that this behavior had any impact on his job title, salary, benefits, or any other 
material aspect of his employment"); Stutler v. lll. Dep't of Corr., 263 F.3d 698, 703-04 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (requiring that "[r]etaliatory harassment ... [must be] severe enough to cause a 
significant change in [employee's] status" because "ostracism by co-workers that [does] not 
result in material harm ... [is] not enough"; further, harassment by supervisor that consisted 
only of threats that were never fulfilled, offensive statements, and relocation to unfinished area 
did not cumulatively constitute material harm as is required to state a claim of retaliation); Holtz 
v. Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 84 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that allegations that employee's 
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to proceed with their claims. 
In addition, the Sixth Circuit has not only borrowed the "sev,ere or 
pervasive" requirement of section 703, but also the principles of vicarious 
liability and the affirmative defense set forth in El[e,rth and Faragher. 196 The 
court reasoned that ''[u]nder agency principles, retaliatory harassment does 
not, in and of itself, constitute a 'tangible employment action.' Therefore, an 
employer is entitled to the same affirmative defense for retaliatory harassment 
that it is entitled to for sexual harassment .... " 197 
Borrowing from the sexual harassment cases, it makes sense for courts to 
distinguish between harassment by coworkers, where there is no evidence that 
the employer was even aware of the action, and harassment by supervisors, 
where agency principles should dictate vicarious liability. Some courts, 
however, have ruled that even where an employer is made aware of 
harassment by coworkers and fails to take any action to correct the, behavior, 
the employer is not liable. 198 Indeed, in two cases from the Fourth Circuit, the 
supervisor and several coworkers fonned a clique and made her feel "'out of the loop' ... [fell] 
well short of the sort of 'materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment"' 
that is actionable under Title VII) (quoting Richardson, 180 F.3d at 446): LaCroix v. Sears, 
Roebuck, & Co., 240 F.3d 688, 691-92 (8th Cit. 2001) (finding that the defendant's "refusal 
to speak to [employee], .•. his, failure to infortn her of mandatory meetings," and his issuance 
of a memorandum of deficiency did not constitute adverse employment action because none of 
these actions ever resulted in a material employment disadvantage); Bell v. EPA, 232 F.3d 546, 
555 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that refusal by a member of promotion selection panel to talk to 
employee and his canceling of a conference that employee had scheduled would not constitute 
adverse employment action since no facts ''indicated a material change in the terms and 
conditions of [plaintiffs] employment''); Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 
. ' 
(8th Cir. 1997) (stating that retaliation claims are restricted to ultimate employment actions, not 
simple hostility, disrespect, or ostracism). 
195. Heno v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 208 F.3d 847, 857 (lOth Cir. 2000) (holding that 
defendants' conduct in moving employee's desk, supervising her calls and acting aloof towards 
her did not amount to adverse employment actions because none of the conduct affected her 
"employment status"). 
196. Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 792 (6th Cir. 2000). 
197. /d. (citation omitted). 
198. Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., Inc., 259 F.3d 261,271-72 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding 
that coworkers' failure to act politely or speak to employee was not an adverse· employment 
action where there was no claim that employer actually instructed coworkers to snub the 
plaintiff; the court stated that employer's failure to correct or reprimand coworker behavior is 
not actionable, and, even where an employer has instructed employees "to ignore and spy on an 
employee," there is no adverse employment action) (quoting Munday v. Waste Mgrnt. of N. 
Am., Inc., 126 F.3d 239, 243 (4th Cir. 1997)).: Compare Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 
1243-45 (9th Cir. 2000) Goining the· Second, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, concluding that a 
retaliatory-based hostile work environment may be an adverse employment action where 
employee was subjected to verbal abuse by supervisors, as well as pranks and false accusations 
of misconduct such that a genuine issue offact was raised regarding sufficiency of the evidence 
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employer actually instructed his employees to ignore and to spy on the 
plaintiff, and yet, the court found no adverse employment action. 199 In another 
case, the Ninth Circuit simply concluded that an employer cannot force 
employees to socialize with one another; thus, ostracism, even though 
triggered by discriminatory or retaliatory motive, cannot constitute an adverse 
employment action. 200 In contrast, in the context of sexual harassment cases, 
the courts have uniformly held that, where an employer is aware of the 
harassing conduct of coworkers and yet fails to take prompt corrective action, 
liability may be imposed.201 
to establish retaliatory hostile work environment), with Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 
(7th Cir. 1996) (finding that demeaning statements made by other employees may meet 
"adverse" standard), and Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1994) (per curiam) 
(finding that toleration of other employee harassment is potentially retaliatory conduct). 
199. Matvia, 259 F.3d at 271-72; see also Munday, 126 F.3d at 241-43 (fmding that 
although an employer's general manager instructed the plaintiffs coworkers to ignore her, spy 
on her, and report anything to him because he wanted to fire her and although plaintiff was 
assigned to a route she did not request and was subjected to other work-related incidents of 
harassment ultimately leading to her departure, ''this scenario does not rise to the level of an 
adverse employment action for Title VII purposes"; absent evidence of any harm to a term, 
condition, or privilege of employment, the mere conduct of ignoring and spying on employee 
is not actionable). Contra Moore v. Kuka Welding Sys., 171 F.3d 1073, 1080 (6th Cir. 1999) 
(holding evidence that plaintiff was isolated from other employees who were instructed not to 
talk or interact with him supported a jury finding of retaliation). 
200. Brooks v~ San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 929 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that, "[b]ecause an 
employer cannot force employees to socialize with one another, ostracism suffered at the hands 
of coworkers cannot constitute an adverse employment action"). But see Richardson v. New 
York State Department ofCo"ectional Service, 180 F.3d 426 (2d Cir. 1999), noting the circuit 
split as to whether an allegation of a hostile environment based on retaliation can satisfy the 
adverse employment element in an ADEA case. The court ruled that "unchecked retaliatory co-
worker harassment, if sufficiently severe, may constitute [an] adverse employment action." /d. 
at 446. If an employer knows about but fails to cot teet coworker hostility, the employer may 
be liable for a hostile environment based on retaliatory animus. /d. at 446; cf Gunnell v. Utah 
Valley State Coli., 152 F.3d 1253, 1264 (lOth Cir. 1998) (rejecting the position taken in the 
Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits, the court joined the First and Seventh Circuits in recognizing 
that a campaign of retaliatory harassment by coworkers may constitute an adverse employment 
action under section 704(a)). 
201. See, e.g., Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 876 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(finding that an employer failed to meet its remedial obligations where it merely "conducted a 
handful of spot checks" but made no real effort to investigate complaint or to threaten serious 
discipline if conduct continued); EEOC v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 256 F.3d 516, 519 (7th Cir. 
2001) (finding that an employer could not rely on a collective bargaining agreement to justify 
its repeated failure to discipline or dismiss employee for sexually harassing fellow female 
employees, even if it might have incurred back pay and other costs for doing so); Dhyne v. 
Meiners Thriftway, Inc., 184 F.3d 983,988 (8th Cir. 1999) (jury could properly conclude that 
employer failed to take prompt action to correct sexual harassment by coworker where it waited 
two months before taking effective action or bringing complaints to director's attention). 
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If the supervisor engages in harassing behavior, however, the sexual 
harassment cases dictate that courts should impose vicarious liability,_ 
although, in the absence of a tangible employment action, an employer has -an 
affrrn1ative defense.202 The employer may escape liability, but only if it 
proves that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any 
harassing behavior and that the employee unreasonably failed to take 
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities. 203 In contrast, in the 
context of a retaliation claim; the employer is on "notice" that an initial charge 
of discrimination is filed against it and, thus, is in a better position to prevent 
retaliatory conduct from occurring. Further, the affrrtnative defense is not 
necessary to encourage employees to mitigate damages by coming forward 
and using the employer's enforcement mechanism the employee has 
already done so. Thus, at least in the context of retaliatory harassment by a 
supervisor, the absolute vicarious liability rule should govern.204 
F. Nonemployment Related Adverse Action 
The distinction between disparate treatment and retaliation cases is very 
significant here. Because disparate treatment cases require discrimination 
with regard to terrns and conditions of employment, an employer who takes 
action outside of the employment context is arguably itmnune from a Title Vll 
disparate treatment claim. In contrast, however, some courts have recognized 
that the retaliation provision is broad enough to cover actions that are not 
employment related.205 Many courts, however, have ignored the clear text of 
202. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
203. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
204. Contra Linda M. Glover, Comment, Title VII Section 704(a) Retaliation Claims: 
Turning a Blind Eye Toward Justice,-38 Hous. L. REv .. 577, 581 n.21 (200 l) (arguing that the 
Ellerth affinna.tive defense should be available in retaliatory harassment cases). 
205. See, e.g., Schobert v. Dl. Dep't of Transp._, 304 F.3d 725, 733-34 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(finding that noneconomic forms of retaliation, as well as adverse actions unrelated to 
employment are actionable, ''includ[ing] non--employment activities such as brick-throwing, tire-
slashing or other unfortunate acts ... [provided] the adverse act ... occurr[ ed] because of the 
employee's exercise of protected rights"); Aviles v. Cornell Forge Co., 241 F.3d 589,593 (7th 
Cir., 2001) (ruling that filing false police reports would violate the retaliation provision, even 
though it found that because the report was true, the claim was not actionable); Veprinsky v. 
Fluor Daniel, Inc., _87 F.3d 881, 892 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that "[a] current employee can sue 
for retaliatory acts that, but for the fact that they are committed by his employer, are unrelated 
to employment as such," and listing several cases finding threats of violence. and tort civil 
actions to be adverse actions); Berry v. Stevenson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980,986 (lOth Cir. 1996) 
(holding that malicious prosecution action against a former employee constitutes an adverse 
employment action for purposes of retaliation claim); Passer v. Am. Chern. Soc'y, 935 F.2d 322, 
331 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding "illegal retaliation in employer conduct that could not be 
described strictly as an 'employment action u'). 
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Title Vll, and instead required that the retaliatory conduct be somehow related 
to the employment relationship. 206 
B_ecause the retaliation provision addresses any discrimination that might 
deter a reasonable person from going forward or from participating in 
another's discrimination claim, the fact that the discriminatory action is not 
employment-related should be irrelevant. Support for this interpretation is 
found in the Supreme Court's decision in Bill Johnson'-s R-estaurant, Inc., v. 
NLRB.201 The Court held that an employer who filed an alleged retaliatory 
lawsuit against an employee violated the retaliation provision of the National 
Labor Relations Act, 208 because a lawsuit "may be used by an employer as a 
powerful instrument of coercion or retaliation."l09 Provided that the lawsuit 
is "baseless"· and brought "with the intent of retaliating against an employee 
for the exercise of protected rights, it should be actionable~ 210 
V. Conclusion 
The trend in the lower courts to dismiss claims of disparate treatment and 
retaliation based on an insufficient demonstration of harm is contrary to the 
text as well as the goals and purposes of Title VII. An examination of the 
facts in these recent cases demonstrates that courts are impernrissibly ignoring 
the real injury that discrimination victims suffer and are instead manufacturing 
requirements that employees show materially adverse, ultimate, or tangible 
employment actions., The courts have similarly failed to distinguish retaliation 
cases where an even more liberal approach is mandated to effectuate 
Congress' concern that employees who are victims of discrimination, or who 
206. See Hernandez v. Crawford Bldg. Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 532-33 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(finding that ''an employer's filing of a counterclaim cannot support a retaliation claim in the 
Fifth Circuit," because such is not an ultimate employment decision); Chock v. Northwest 
Airlines, Inc., 113 F.3d 861, 865 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that employer's alleged obstruction 
of employee'·s studies for an M.B.A .. and his attempt to prevent employee from living with his 
direct supervisor was not an adverse employment action because "[n]either the MBA classes nor 
the living arrangement with his supervisor [were] benefil& of his employment with Northwest''); 
Nelson v. Upsala Coli., 51 F.3d 383, 387 (3d Cir~ 1995) ("Although '[t]he connection with 
employment need not necessarily be direct,' it does not further the purpose of Title Vll to apply 
section 704 to conduct unrelated to an employment relationship.") (quoting Lutcher v. 
Musicians Union Local47, 633 F.2d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 1980)) (alteration in original) (citation 
omitted). 
207. 461 u.s. 731 (1983). 
208. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2000). 
209" Bill Johnson's,. 461 U.S. at 740. 
210. Id. at744. NotethattheNLRA'santiretaliationprovision was the model for Title Vll's 
antiretaliation provision. See Equal Employment Opportunity: Hearings on H.R. 405 Before 
the Comm. on Educ. & Labor, Gen. Subcomm, on lAbor, 88th Cong. 83-84 (1963)., 
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seek to aid others in pursuing their claims; will not be chilled in coming 
forward. The courts have adopted what is in essence a "no hann, no foul" 
rule, which shifts attention away from. the employer's discriminatory action 
or retaliatory treatment, contrary to both the statute and earlier Supreme Court 
precedent. These decisions also ignore the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the 
purpose of which was to guarantee that emotional injury is compensable under 
Title Vll. Congress' goal of affording true equal opportunity in the workplace 
to all employees cannot be achieved as long as litigants are ·made to jump 
through. judge-made obstacles that close the doors to the courthouse without 
affording employees the opportunity to prove injury caused by discriminatory 
wrongdoing. 
